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ABSTRACT 
In this an attempt has been made to analytically evaluate the cause for formation and 
perpetuation of high levels of NPAs in Indian public sector banks (PSBs) and what is its 
present status. It points out that a high degree of arbitrariness is involved in defining 
NPAs as it fails to capture diversity in terms of the seasonal and cyclical nature of the 
economic activities in India. It is highlighted that the use of a secondary asset market may 
take care of NPA problem, but it requires a number of conditions for its use, which hardly 
exist in India. The study observes a number of reasons of generation of NPAs such as 
high share of lending to priority sector, absence of adequate security, legal environment, 
low level of expertise, repeated lending to same person with similar dubious 
characteristics, lack of vision of bank in sanctioning, reviewing and enhancing credit 
limits, political interference, diversion of funds by borrowers, inefficient monitoring over 
use of funds. While one set of policies granting greater autonomy to the PSBs are proved 
to be quite effective in restricting formation of fresh NPAs, the other set of policies 
designed to recover loans, after default, have failed to deliver the goods. It is expected 
that concerned institutions will work out their strategic response in keeping with the 
broad thrust of early recognition of the problem, identifying borrowers with genuine 
intent, timeliness and adequacy of response, effective management, in a highly 
competitive environment, banks have to address to the following changes in this critical 
area: manpower planning, talent management, awareness development, well-developed 
capital markets. Institutions are very difficult to change - it not only requires stringent 
punitive enactment and vigilance, but also public awareness, campaign and reforming 
electoral colleagues. Political forces to induce default must be contained. Finally, it 
concludes by making an assessment of the existing institutions and highlights the fact that 
the incidence of NPA is as much due to the malfunctioning of the banking institutions as 
due to the external institutional environment. 
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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
The modem banking system in India started with establishment of the first joint stock 
bank- the General Bank of India in 1876. After, this first bank, Bank of Hindustan and 
Bengal Bank came to existence. In the middle of \9^ century East India Company 
established three banks, The Bank of Bengal in 1809, the Bank of Bombay in 1940 and 
the Bank of Madras in 1843. These banks were the independent units and called 
Presidency bank. These three banks amalgamated in 1920 and a new bank. Imperial Bank 
of India was established. After independence passing the SBI Act 1955 nationalized the 
Imperial Bank of India. The Reserve bank of India as a central bank was nationalized in 
1935. The several new banks such as Punjab National Bank, Bank of Baroda, Canara 
Bank, Indian Bank, Bank of India etc were established after independence. On July 19, 
1969, fourteen major banks nationalized. At present the number of nationalized banks are 
nineteen. Several banks were allowed to operate as per the guidelines of RBI. At present 
the PSBs banking system can be classified as follows. 
1. Public Sector Banks 
RBI, SBI, and its Seven associates. 
Nationalized Banks (19 in number). 
Regional rural Banks sponsored by 
PSBs. 
All the types of banks are controlled by the RBI and thereby all the banks have to follow 
the guidelines of the RBI. Government used banks to provide credit and loans to weaker 
sections. This led to serious crises of unrecoverable debt. Such unrecoverable debt id 
called Non- Performing Assets (NPAs). 
Non-performing Asset (NPA) has emerged since over a decade as an alarming threat to 
the banking industry in our country sending distressing signals on the sustainability and 
endurability of the affected banks. The positive results of the chain of measures effected 
under banking reforms by the Government of India and RBI in terms of the two 
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Narasimhan Committee Reports in this contemporary period have been neutralised by the 
ill effects of this surging threat. It is a sweeping and all pervasive virus confronted 
universally on banking and fmancial institutions. The severity of the problem is however 
acutely suffered by Nationalised Banks, followed by the SBI group, and the all India 
Financial Institutions. 
The severity of the incidence of non-performing assets (NPA henceforth) in 
Indian public sector banks (PSBs henceforth), noted in the early 1990s, raised a severe 
hue and cry in various quarters. In fact, the problem started much earlier, which became 
evident from continued recapitalisation of many PSBs since 1985-86'. Whatever be the 
root cause, malfunctioning of the PSBs increased by the end of the 1980s. This led to the 
setting up of the Narasimham Committee (1991), which, in fact, identified NPA as one of 
the possible causes/effects of the malfunctioning of the PSBs. In order to quantify the 
NPA problem, Narasimham Committee (1991) made it mandatory on the part of the 
banks to publish annually the magnitude of NPAs. NPAs are those categories of assets 
(advances, bills discounted, overdraft, cash credits etc) for which any amount remains 
due for a period of 180 days." Following the recommendations, banks started publishing 
in their annual reports NPA data, which were astonishingly high. RBI (1999) report on 
NPA stated that reduction in NPA should be treated as a 'national priority'. In the Task 
Force'" report on non-performing assets in the Indian financial system, it is argued that 
three NPA ridden banks (UCO bank. United Bank of India and Indian Bank) are open 
sores threatening the health of the entire financial system. The report went to the extent of 
stating 
that these banks were not viable candidates either for privatization or for merger, and thus 
they should be closed down. The Verma Comnjittee (1999), on the other hand, felt that 
these three banks could be revived i f^ey submit themselves to the discipline of 
a rigorous restructuring, undei:pfnned with adequate infusion of funds and 
simultaneous relief from the load of NPA and excess manpower. The difference in the 
respective recommendations has provoked protests of varying orders of frenzy, from the 
unionized employees. 
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The region of operation however matters. This is a very significant contribution to 
understanding of the phenomenon and the steps to tackle it. The policy implications of 
the results of the paper are that sustainable reform in the financial sector and 
improvement in the performing efficiency of domestic banks require improvement in the 
enforcement environment in some regions of the country. The regional exposure effect 
would be more transparently evident were banks to report NPAs by state or region 
instead of merely as a national average as at present. The operating environment matters 
particularly in the Indian context where there are externally imposed compulsions on 
banks to enter into and operate in difficult regions. The environmental limits on bank 
operations cannot be tackled by reforms at bank level alone as will be discussed in a 
section below. Another paper by Rajaraman and Vasishth (2002) performed panel 
regression on NPA data of twenty-seven public sector banks covering a five-year period 
from 1995-96 to 1999-2000. Surprisingly, very few serious attempts have been made to 
find out the causes or determinants of the NPA in Indian banks. Without such a study, 
policy recommendations and measures to contain NPA would not be of much use, as 
evident from the continued poor performance of PSBs in spite of ten years of reforms. 
The present study makes an attempt to fill up such a gap. Once the root causes of NPA 
are identified, one can evaluate the policies and find the lacuna therein in order to 
understand why the pace of improvement in the NPA scenario has been so slow. 
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1.2 MEANING OF NPAs 
An asset is classified as non-performing asset (NPAs) if the borrower does not pay dues 
in the form of principal and interest for a period of 180 days. However with effect from 
March 2004, default status would be given to a borrower if dues are not paid for 90 days. 
If any advance or credit facilities granted by bank to a borrower becomes non-
performing, then the bank will have to treat all the advances/credit facilities granted to 
that borrower as non-performing without having any regard to the fact that there may still 
exist certain advances / credit facilities having performing status. 
In the simple words, an asset, which ceases to yield income, is an NPA. For instance 
those loan given by a bank or financial institution, where the borrower defaults or delays 
interest or principle amount payments for two quarters or more. 
NPAs suddenly in the Indian Banking scenario, arround the 80s, is the midst of turbulent 
structural changes overtaking the international banking institutions and when the global 
financial markets were undergoing sweeping changes. After it emergeed the problem of 
NPA kept hidden and gradually swelling unnoticed and unpercieved, in the moze of 
deffective accounting standards rhat still continue with Indian Banks upto 90s and opaque 
balance sheets. 
It's a known fact that the banks and financial institutions in India face the problem of 
swelling non-performing assets (NPAs) and the issue is becoming more and more 
unmanageable. In order to bring the situation under control, some steps have been taken 
recently. The Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of 
Security Interest Act, 2002 was passed by Parliament, which is an important step towards 
elimination or reduction of NPAs. 
CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 
1.3 THE UNSEEN AND UNPERCEIVED EDGE OF NPAs 
NPA surfaced suddenly in the Indian banking scenario, around the Eighties, in the midst 
of turbulent structural changes overtalcing the international banking institutions, and 
when the global financial markets were undergoing sweeping changes. We have already 
discussed these changes in detail in an earlier Chapter. In fact after it had emerged the 
problem of NPA kept hidden and gradually swelling unnoticed and unperceived, in the 
maze of defective accounting standards that still continued with Indian Banks up to the 
Nineties and opaque Balance sheets. 
In a dynamic world, it is true that new ideas and new concepts that emerge through such 
changes caused by social evolution bring beneficial effects, but only after levying a heavy 
initial toll. The process of quickly integrating new innovations in the existing set-up leads 
to an immediate disorder and unsettled conditions. People are not accustomed to the new 
models. These new formations take time to configure, and work smoothly. The old is cast 
away and the new is found difficult to adjust. Marginal and sub-marginal operators are 
swept away by these convulsions. Banks being sensitive institutions entrenched deeply in 
traditional beliefs and conventions were unable to adjust themselves to the changes. They 
suffered easy victims to this upheaval in the initial phase. 
The government hastily introduced the first phase of reforms in the financial and banking 
sectors after the economic crisis of 1991. This was an effort to quickly resurrect the 
health of the banking system and bridge the gap between Indian and global banking 
development. Indian Banking, in particular PSBs suddenly woke up to the realities of the 
situation and to face the burden of the surfeit of their woes. Simultaneously major 
revolutionary transitions were taking place in other sectors of the economy on account 
the ongoing economic reforms intended towards freeing the Indian economy from 
government controls and linking it to market driven forces for a quick integration with 
the global economy. Import restrictions were gradually freed. Tariffs were brought down 
and quantitative controls were removed. The Indian market was opened for free 
competition to the global players. The new economic policy in turns revolutionalised the 
environment of the Indian industry and business and put them to similar problems of new 
mixture of opportunities and challenges. As a result we witness today a scenario of 
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banking, trade and industry in India, all undergoing the convulsions of total reformation 
battling to kick off the decadence of the past and to gain a new strength and vigour for 
effective links with the global economy. Many are still languishing unable to get released 
from the old set-up, while a few progressive corporates are making a niche for 
themselves in the global context. 
During this decade the reforms have covered almost every segment of the financial 
sector. In particular, it is the banking sector, which experienced major reforms. The 
reforms have taken the Indian banking sector far away from the days of nationalization. 
Increase in the number of banks due to the entry of new private and foreign banks; 
increase in the transparency of the banks' balance sheets through the introduction of 
prudential norms and norms of disclosure; increase in the role of the market forces due to 
the deregulated interest rates, together with rapid computerisation and application of the 
benefits of information technology to banking operations have all significantly affected 
the operational environment of the Indian banking sector. 
In the background of these complex changes when the problem of NPA was belatedly 
recognised for the first time at its peak velocity during 1992-93, there was resultant chaos 
and confusion. As the problem in large magnitude erupted suddenly banks were unable to 
analyze and make a realistic or complete assessment of the surmounting situation. It was 
not realised that the root of the problem of NPA was centered elsewhere in multiple 
layers, as much outside the banking system, more particularly in the transient economy of 
the country, as within. Banking is not a compartmentalized and isolated sector delinked 
from the rest of the economy. As has happened elsewhere in the world, a distressed 
national economy shifts a part of its negative results to the banking industry. In short, 
banks are made ultimately to finance the losses incurred by constituent industries and 
businesses. The unpreparedness and structural weakness of our banking system to act to 
the emerging scenario and de-risk itself to the challenges thrown by the new order, trying 
to switch over to globalisation were only aggravating the crisis. Partial perceptions and 
hasty judgements led to a policy of ad-hoc-ism, which characterised the approach of the 
authorities during the last two-decades towards finding solutions to banking ailments and 
dismantling recovery impediments. Continuous concern was expressed. Repeated 
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correctional efforts were executed, but positive results were evading. The problem was 
defying a solution. 
The assessment of the mix-of contributing factors should have included human factors 
(those pertaining to the bankers and the credit customers), environmental imbalances in 
the economy on account of wholesale changes and also inherited problems of Indian 
banking and industry. 
While banks functioned for several decades under ethnic culture, Indian business and 
industry were owned, controlled or managed by single families, all having been nurtured 
and developed through innovative zeal of pioneers, represented by one dominant 
individual towering at each set-up. This inherently convey the sole-proprietorship culture 
and unable to quickly transform to modem professionally managed corporations of the 
global standard, where operations should be conducted on a decentralized knowledge-
based work-group- an integrated teams of specialists each contributing to a core area of 
management. The Indian management set up everywhere turns mostly as one-man show 
even today. 
Variable skill, efficiency and level integrity prevailing in different branches and in 
different banks accounts for the sweeping disparities between inter-bank and intra-bank 
performance. We may add that while the core or base-level NPA in the industry is due to 
common contributory causes, the inter-se variations are on account of the structural and 
operational disparities. The heavy concentrated prevalence of NPA is definitely due to 
human factors contributing to the same. 
No bank appears to have conducted studies involving a cross-section of its operating field 
staff, including the audit and inspection functionaries for a candid and comprehensive 
introspection based on a survey of the variables of NPA burden under different categories 
of sectoral credit, different regions and in individual Branches categorized as with high, 
medium and low incidence of NPA. We do not hear the voice of the operating personnel 
in these banks candidly ^xpressed and explaining their failures. Ex-bankers, i.e. the 
professional bankers who have retired from service, but possess a depth of inside 
knowledge do not out-pour candidly their views. After three decades of nationalised 
banking, we must have some hundreds of retired Bank executives in the country, who can 
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boldly and independently, but objectively voice their views. Everyone is satisfied in 
blaming the others. Bank executives hold 'willful defaulters' responsible for all the 
plague. Industry and business blames the government policies. 
An important fact-revealing information for each NPA account is the gap period between 
the date, when the advance was originally made and the date of its becoming NPA. If the 
gap is long, it is the case of a sunset industry. Things were all right earlier, but economic 
variance in trade cycles or market sentiments have created the NPA. 
Significant part of the NPA is on account of clout banking or willfully given bad loans. 
Infant mortality in credit is solely on account of human factors and absence of human 
integrity. 
The credit portfolio of a nationalised bank also includes^jiumber of low-risk and risk-
free segmentlrwhich cannot create NPA. Small personal loans against banks own 
deposits and other tangible and easily marketable securities pledged to the bank and held 
in its custody are of this category. Such small loans are universally given in almost all the 
branches and hence the aggregate constitutes a significant figure. Then there is food 
credit given to FCI for food procurement and similar credits given to major public 
Utilities and Public Sector Undertakings of the Central Government. It is only the 
residual fragments of Bank credit that are exposed to credit failures and reasons for NPA 
can be ascertained by scrutinising this segment. 
Secondly NPA is not a dilemma facing exclusively the Bankers. It is in fact an all 
pervasive national scourge swaying the entire Indian economy. NPA is a sore throat of 
the Indian economy as a whole. The banks are only the ultimate victims, where life cycle 
of the virus is terminated. 
In short, the functional staff of the Bank along with the,representatives of business and 
industry have to accept a candid introspection and arrive at a code of discipline in any 
final solution. And preventive action to be successfiil should start from the credit-
recipient level and then extend to the bankers. RBI and Government of India can 
positively facilitate the process by providing enabling measures. Do not try to set right 
industry and banks, but help industry and banks to set right themselves. The new tool of 
deregulated approach has to be accepted in solving NPA. 
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CHAPTER 2 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
Objectives of the Study 
1. To review tlie problem of N?As in public sector banks. 
2. To study the Prudential ^orms related to NPAs 
3. To study the major reasons of arising NPAs. 
4. To critically analyse the statistics on Public sector banks. 
5. The suggested measures to reduce the NPAs in Public sector banks. 
This study is based on secondary source of information. The data and information has 
been collected from various books, reports magazines, and websites. 
Limitations: 
1. This study is ba^d on the secondary source of information. 
2. Study is conc||UCted in short time period. 
3. Limited Finance availability. 
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CHAPTER 3 PRUDENTIAL NORMS RELATED TO NPAs 
2.1 PRUDENTIAL NORMS RELATED TO NPAs 
In 1992-93 prudential norms were introduced with greater transparency and securing the 
long-term sustainability of the banks. Presented below is a profile of those related with 
income recognition and asset classification. 
Income Recognition 
Interest income should not be realized until it is realized. An NPA is one where interest is 
overdue for two quarters or more. In respect of NPAs, interest is not due to be recognized 
on accrual basis, but is to be treated as income only when it actually received. On Non-
Performing accounts the banks should not charge or taken at income unless it realized. 
Asset Ciassiflcation 
The banks should classify their asset based on weakness and dependability on collateral 
securities. 
Assets are classified: 
Performing assets 
Non-Performing assets 
Performing asset: 
They also known as standard assets and are loans where the interest and /or principle are 
not overdue beyond 180 days at the end of the financial year. Such loans don't carry 
more than normal business risk. 
Non-Performing Assets 
NPAs are those loans given by a bank or financial institution, where the borrower 
defaults or delays interest or principle payment for two quarters or more. 
Classification of NPA 
NPA are further classified into 
Sub-Standard Asset 
Doubtful Asset 
Loss Asset 
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Sub-Standard assets: loans which are not performing for a period not exceeding two 
years, where the current net worth of borrower or the current market value of the security, 
against which the loan is taken, is not enough to ensure full recovery of the debt. 
Doubtful Assets: Loans, which have remained non-performing for period exceeding two 
years (18 months, with effect from March 2001). 
Loss Assets: Assets, where internal/external auditor has identified loss appointed by RBI, 
but the amount has not been written off wholly or partly. These assets are classified as 
unrecoverable and are of little value to the lending institution. 
Based on the assets classification, banks have to make the following provisions in 
their books for advances, which are considered NPAs. 
1. Loss assets: The entire amount has to be written off. If the assets are to remain in the 
books for any reason, 100% of the outstanding amount should be provided for. 
2. Doubtful Assets: 
a) 100% to the extent of which advances is unsecured. 
b) Over and above (a) provision ranging from 20% to 50% of the secured position 
for which the advances has been considered as doubtful depending upon period 
given below. 
Upto 1- year old doubtful asset: 20%. 
1-3 year old doubtful asset: 30%. 
Over 3-year-old doubtful asset: 50%. 
3. Sub-standard assets: A general provision of 10% of the outstanding amount should 
be made in this category. 
Gross NPAs are the total assets outstanding of all the borrowers classified as non-
performing assets (viz.- sub-standard, doubtful and loss assets). 
Net NPA is the gross NPA minus the gross provision made unrealized interest and 
unadjusted credit balance with regard to various NPA accounts. 
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2.2 DISCLOSURE NORM FOR NPAs IN BANKS 
Banks and financial insttution (FIs) have been advised to report to RBI deatails of 
borrowal accounts calssified as doubbtlul and loss and suit-filed accounts of Rs. 1 crore 
and above as on 31 March and 30 September every year, wide circular DBOD No. 
BC/CIS 47/20.16.002/94 dated April 23, 1994. Further, it was indicated that based on the 
information so colected, RBI will be publishing in a booklet form the list of suit-filed 
accounts of Rs. 1 crore and above and an update on a half yaerly basis. Subsequently, 
banks and Fis were advised to submit, separately, a complete list of suit-filed accounts of 
Rs. 1 crore and above as on 31 March for publication purposes and quarterly update 
showing deletion from/addition to the above list complete list of suit-filed accounts as on 
31 March is published in bokklet form by RBI, this list and its quarterly updates are 
available in RBI website. 
With a view to avoiding duplication in reporting suit-filed accounts of Rs. 1 crore and 
above under both suit-filed and under NPA (Doubtful and loss) category, banks and Fis 
are advised to report, hereafter: 
• All non suit-filed doubtftil and loss accounts of Rs. 1 crore and above. 
• All suit-filed accounts of Rs. 1 crore and 
• Quarterly updates of suit-filed accounts. 
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2.3 ACCOUNTING PROCEDURES FOR NPAs 
1. All NPAs accounts, including those with outstading below Rs. 25,000/- and 
government guaranteed accounts other than protested category should be transferred 
to a seaprate ledger to be called "NPA ledger" by passing necessary transfer voucher. 
2. NPA ledger is to be maintained facility wise. 
3. Thew outstanding balance in account as on date of transfer sahll be the opening debit 
entry in the ladger section and all debit and credits are to be entered and no entry in 
respect of recorded interest is to be entered in this section. 
4. The outstanding balance in the accounts as on the date of transfer shall be the opening 
entry in the Memoranda Book. Thereafter the interest on quarterly/ half yearly period 
as the case may be, shall be calculated and posted. All other debit and credit vouchers 
as are entered in the section shall also be entered in memoranda book. 
5. Ledger section of NPA ledger shall reflect balance outstanding without interest 
element and memoranda record section of NPA ledger shall reflect shall show 
balance outstanding inclusive recorded interest. 
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CHAPTER 4 ANALYSIS OF NPAs STATISTICS 
3.1 ANALYSIS OF NPAs STATISTICS 
Non-prforming assets has emerged since over a decade as a alarming threat to the 
banking industry in the country sending distressing signals on the sustainalibility and 
endurability of the effected banks. The positive results of the chain of measures effected 
under banking reforms by the government of India and RBI in terms of the two 
Narasimhan committee reports in this contemporary period has been neutralized by the ill 
effects of this surging threat. Despite verious correctional steps administered to solve and 
end this problem, concrete results are eluding. It is a sweeping and all pervasive virus 
confronted universally on banking and financial institutions. 
Gross NPAs of public sector banks decline As a sign of growing competitiveness in the 
Indian banking sector, the gross NPAs of public sector banks declined to Rs 54,086 crore 
in 2002-03, from Rs 56,473 crore in FY 2001-02, Reserve Bank of India said in its 
Report on Trend and Progress in Banking In India 2002-03. 
But the gross NPAs for new private banks rose to Rs 7,232 crore, from Rs 6,821 crore 
and that of foreign banks increased to Rs 2,829 crore, from Rs 2,469 crore. "The NPAs 
declined sharply in FY 2002-03, reflecting, inter alia the salutory impact of earlier 
measures towards NPA reduction and enactment of the Securitisation Act (SARFAESI) 
Act ensuring prompter recovery without intervention of court or tribunal," RBI said. 
Since the commencement or enforcement of the SARFAESI Act till end-June 2003, 
public sector banks have issued 33,736 notices for an outstanding amount of Rs 12,147 
crore and have recovered Rs 499.2 crore from 9,946 cases. 
Public sector banks have identified NPAs worth over Rs 12,000 crore to be sold to the 
asset reconstruction companies. However, the process of valuation of the loans prior to 
sale was yet to be completed, RBI added. State Bank of India has 
recovered a meagre Rs 48 crore as against outstandings of Rs 3,974 crore for which it had 
issued 7,141 notices, the report said. 
RBI report showed that Punjab National Bank, Central Bank of India and Oriental Bank 
of Commerce have issued 3,015 notices, 2,617 notices and 2,217 notices respectively. It 
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also noted that NPAs of the State Bank Group stood at Rs 16,958.1 crore as on end-
March 2003 while that of State Bank of India was pegged at Rs 13,257.27 crore. 
According to the RBI, a major factor contributing to the high level of NPAs in India has 
been the inadequate legal framework for collecting overdue loans(TabIe 1). 
The most pertinent and alarming cause of concern of the banking sector in India is the 
amount of Non-performing Assets. Gross NPAs increased to Rs.63,883 crores as at 
March-end 2001 from Rs.60,408 crores as at March-end 2000. Net NPAs as at March-
end 2001 amounted to Rs.32,468 crores as compared to Rs.30,073 crores as at March-end 
2000. The ratios of gross and net NPAs to total advances however declined to 11.4% and 
6.2% as at March-end 2001 from 12.7% and 6.8% as at March-end 2000 respectively. 
The gross NPAs of Public Sector banks as at March-end 2001 was Rs.54,773 crores as 
against Rs.53,033 as at March-end 2000. The share of PSBs in total NPAs of SCBs 
declined to 85.7% from 87.8% during this period. The ratio of gross NPAs to total 
advances declined from 14.0% as at March-end 2000 to 12.4% as at March-end 2001 and 
that of net NPAs to net advances declined from 7.4% to 6.7% during this period. 
The reason for increase in NPAs can be attributed to the inability in the existing process 
of debt recovery, inadequate legal provision on fore-closure and bankruptcy and 
difficulties in the speedy executions of court decrees. Any solution to this problem 
requires well-defined long term plan with both short and medium term action plan having 
specific definition of goals support action and process rather than ad hoc approach. 
As per a report compiled by ICRA, the combined net profits of the 27 PSU banks 
increased by 48 per cent to Rs 12,294 crore in the last fiscal.Net NPAs fell drastically 
from 5.8 to 4.5 per cent.The capital base of PSU banks increased to Rs 14,175 crore by 
the end of last fiscal, from Rs 3,034 crore in 1990-91, with all the banks meeting the RBI 
stipulated 9.0 per cent capital adequacy ratio by March 31,2003(Table4). 
For PSU banks, gross NPAs under priority sector accounted for 44.5 per cent of their 
entire gross NPAs. In 10 out of 27 PSU banks, priority sector NPAs constituted more 
than 50 per cent of their gross NPAs. ICRA feel that the securitisation laws and the 
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proposed Credit Information Bureau is expected to help banks in bringing down their 
NPAs further. 
The capital base of PSU banks increased to Rs 14,175 crore by the end of last fiscal, from 
Rs 3,034 crore in 1990-91, with all the banks meeting the RBI stipulated 9.0 per cent 
capital adequacy ratio by March 31,2003. The main reason for improvement in CAR was 
the Rs 22,500 crore recapitalisation in 19 PSU banks during the last decade.In 2002-03, 
Canara Bank, PNB, Union Bank and Allahabad Bank raised nearly Rs 937 crore. 
As per ICRA report, the combined income of the PSU banks inched up 9.6 per cent to Rs 
1,28,464 crore last fiscal. The trend in declining interest rates in the economy resulted in 
a mere 1.0 per cent increase in Interest Expenses to Rs 69,853 crore. NPAs and taxes 
resulted in a 30.3 per cent rise in provisions to Rs 17,420 crore. 
Taking advantage of loopholes in the old banking law, PSBs developed enough laxity to 
accumulate a large volume of NPA. It is clear from the figures of NPA that are available 
for each year since 1993. Gross NPAs in the PSBs have increased rapidly from Rs 39 
thousand crores in 1993 to Rs 54 thousand crores in 2003 as shown in table 1. It grew at a 
rate of around five percent per annum during the period excepting the last year when it 
declined. Sheer size of NPA and its growth rate over the greater part of the 1990s 
indicate the ill health of the Indian public sector banks. In the year 1994, it was found that 
almost a quarter of the total volume of existing advances made by these banks remained 
non-performing. After implementations of the Narasimham Committee Report (1991) 
banks could no longer show interest on an accrual basis but it had to make provisioning 
from its income while granting of advances. This called for recapitalisation of these 
banks. 
Further, recapitalisation was required to a large extent in order to write off bad debts. The 
total bad debt written off by 27 PSBs in 1997-98 was Rs 2,800 crores. A number of 
profitable Indian PSBs recorded huge increases in bad debt write offs in 1998-99 as 
compared to previous years. One more compelling reason for recapitalisation was to enter 
into capital market'*'. Since the beginning of banking reforms in the early eighties, the 
government has contributed Rs 20,046 crores towards recapitalisation and allowed banks 
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to write off Rs 3,978 crores. Clearly, in the pre-reform era, when provisioning was not 
done, the profits of PSBs were overstated in their accounts. However, it is interesting to 
note that recapitalisation started as early as 1985-86, as noted by Mathur (2002). This is 
indicative of the malfunctioning of the banks which started much before Narasimham 
Committee and continued throughout the nineties (Table S). 
Table 1 
End 
Marc 
h 
1993 
1994 
1995 
1996 
1997 
1998 
1999 
2000 
2001 
2002 
2003 
: Gross and Net NPAs of PSBs 
Gross 
NPAs 
(1) 
39^53 
41,041 
38385 
41661 
43577 
45653 
51710 
53033 
54672 
56473 
54086 
Gross 
Advanc 
e 
(2) 
169,194 
165,488 
196,846 
231,450 
2 4 « 1 4 
2849>l-
325,328 
379,461 
442,134 
509,368 
577,813 
(1) 
as a 
% 
of 
(2) 
(3) 
23.2 
24.8 
19.5 
18 
17.5. 
-<€ 
15.9 
14 
12.4 
11.1 
9.4 
(1) 
As 
a % 
of 
tot. 
Asst 
(4) 
12 
11 
8.7 
8 .2^ 
<% 
7 
6.7 
6 
5.3 
4.9 
4.2 
(amounts in Rs crores 
Net 
NPAs 
(5) 
NA 
NA 
17567 
-r8297 
20285 
21232 
24211 
26187 
27,977 
27958 
24963 
Net 
Advanc 
e 
(6) 
NA 
NA 
164,178 
205,584 
220,922 
260,459 
297,789 
352,714 
415,207 
480,681 
549,351 
(5) 
as 
a 
% 
of 
(2) 
(7) 
N 
A 
N 
A 
11 
8.9 
9.2 
8.2 
8.1 
7.4 
6.7 
5.8 
4.5 
(6) 
As a 
% of 
tot. 
Asset 
(8) 
NA 
NA 
4 
3.6 
3.6 
3.3 
3.1 
2.9 
2.7 
2.4 
1.9 
Incre 
ment 
in 
Gros 
s 
NPA 
s(9) 
NA 
1788 
2656 
3276 
1916 
2076 
6057 
1323 
1639 
1801 
2387 
Incre 
ment 
in 
gross 
Adv. 
(10) 
NA 
-3,706 
31,358 
34,604 
12,764 
40,757 
40,357 
54,133 
62,673 
67,234 
68,445 
(9) as 
a % of 
(10) 
(11) 
NA 
-48.25 
-8.47 
9.47 
15.01 
5.09 
15.01 
2.44 
2.62 
2.68 
-3.49 
Gross 
minus 
net 
NPA 
(12) 
NA 
NA 
20,818 
23,364 
23,292 
24,421 
27,499 
26,846 
26,695 
28,515 
29,123 
Source: RBI website: www.rbi.org.in 
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Gross and Net NPAs of PSBs (amounts in Rs crores) 
• End March 1993 1994 • Gross NPAs -1 39.253 41,041 D Grass Advance -2 169,194 165,488 
a (1) as a % of (2) -3 23.2 24.8 H O ) Asa% oftot. Asst -4 12 11 • Net NPAs -5 MA NA 
• NetAd\ence-6NANA a (5) as a % of (2) -7 NA NA • (6) As a % of toL Asset-8 NANA 
• Increment in Gross NPAs (9) NA 1788 D Increment in gross Adv. -10 NA -3.706 • (9) as a % of (10) -11 NA -48.25 
• Gross minus net NPA -12 NA NA 
Table 2: Asset classification based on quality (Amount in Rs crores) 
Year 
1993 
1994 
1995 
1996 
1997 
1998 
1999 
2000 
2001 
2002 
2003 
Growt 
h Rate 
1993-
2003 
(%) 
1 
Standar 
d 
Assets 
130087 
124580 
158967 
189660 
200637 
239318 
273618 
326783 
387360 
452862 
523724 
15.86 
2 Sub-
standa 
rd 
assets 
12552 
12163 
7758 
9299 
12471 
14463 
16033 
16361 
14745 
15788 
14909 
4.85 
3 
Doubtf 
ul 
assets 
20106 
23317 
22913 
24707 
26015 
25819 
29252 
30535 
33485 
33658 
32340 
5.15 
4 
Loss 
assets 
393 
4073 
3732 
4351 
5090 
5371 
6425 
6398 
6544 
7061 
6840 
19.04 
Total 
assets 
163138 
164133 
193370 
228017 
244213 
284971 
325328 
380077 
442134 
509369 
577813 
14.24 
1 as 
% of 
total 
asset 
s 
76.8 
75.2 
80.6 
82.0 
82.2 
84.0 
84.1 
86.0 
87.6 
88.9 
90.6 
NA 
2 as 
% of 
total 
asset 
s 
7.4 
7.4 
3.9 
4.0 
5.1 
5.1 
4.9 
4.3 
3.3 
3.1 
2.6 
NA 
3 as 
% of 
total 
assets 
11.9 
14.1 
11.6 
10.7 
10.6 
9.1 
9.0 
8.0 
7.6 
6.6 
5.6 
NA 
4 as 
% of 
total 
asset 
s 
2.3 
2.4 
1.9 
1.9 
2.1 
1.9 
2.0 
1.7 
1.5 
1.4 
1.2 
NA 
Source: RBI website: rbiorg.in 
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Over the year's bank advances increased much faster rate than that of NPA and thereby 
reduced the share of gross NPA in gross advances to 14 percent by the end of the decade 
and close to 9 percent in 2003. In terms of total assets of these banks, it was found that 
around 11 percent of these assets were non-performing in 1994, this ratio however 
substantially declined to 6 percent in 2000 and close to 4 percent in 2003. This happened 
not because of the substantial recovery of NPA but due to a rapid increase in bank 
advances and assets. Further, as shown in table 1, increment of gross NPA was quite high 
throughout the period under consideration, excepting in 1995 and 2003*. This, in other 
words, shows that the volume of fresh defaults far exceeded the recovery in these years. 
Table 3: NPAs distribution across sectors (Rs crores) 
Year 
1995 
1996 
1997 
1998 
1999 
2000 
2001 
2002 
2003 
Growth 
Rate 
1995-
2003 (%) 
Priority 
Sector 
Gross 
NPA 
19208 
19106 
20776 
21184 
22606 
23715 
24156 
25139 
24938 
3.88 
Non-
Priority 
Sector 
Gross 
NPA 
17861 
19067 
21340 
23107 
27608 
28524 
27307 
30251 
26781 
6.38 
Public 
Sector 
Gross 
NPA 
1316 
1411 
1461 
1362 
1496 
1055 
1711 
1116 
1087 
-2.32 
Total 
Gross 
NPA 
38385 
39584 
43577 
45653 
51710 
53294 
53174 
56506 
52807 
4.95 
Share of 
Priority 
Sector 
NPA in 
Total (%) 
50 
48.3 
47.7 
46.4 
43.7 
44.5 
45.4 
44.5 
47.2 
>5A 
Share of 
Non-
priority 
Sector NPA 
in Total (%) 
46.5 
48.2 
49 
50.6 
53.4 
53.5 
51.4 
53.5 
50.7 
NA 
Share of 
Public Sector 
NPA in 
Total (%) 
3.4 
3.6 
3.3 
3 
2.9 
2 
3.2 
2.0 
2.1 
>5A 
Source: RBI website: rbLorg.in 
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Table 4. Non-Performing Assets as percentage of Advances - Public Sector Banks 
(Per cent) 
Sr. 
No. 
1 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
Name of the Bank 
2 
Nationalised Banks 
Allahabad Bank 
Andhra Bank 
BankofBaroda 
Bank of India 
Bank of Maharashtra 
Canara Bank 
Central Bank of India 
Corporation Bank 
Dena Bank 
Indian Bank 
Indian Overseas Bank 
Oriental Bank oi 
Commerce 
Punjab & Sind Bank 
Punjab National Bank 
Syndicate Bank 
UCO Bank 
Union Bank of India 
Gross NPAs/Gross Advances 
1999-
2000 
3 
13.91 
19.07 
7.85 
14.73 
12.89 
12.65 
9.60 
16.63 
5.39 
18.17 
32.77 
13.18 
5.54 
15.27 
13.19 
7.74 
18.79 
12.27 
2000-
01 
4 
12.16 
17.66 
6.13 
14.11 
10.25 
12.35 
7.48 
16.06 
5.40 
25.31 
21.76 
11.81 
5.21 
18.45 
11.71 
7.87 
11.64 
11.20 
2001-
02 
5 
11.01 
16.94 
5.26 
12.39 
9.37 
10.44 
6.22 
14.70 
5.19 
24.11 
17.86 
11.35 
6.57 
18.19 
11.38 
8.35 
9.59 
10.77 
2002-
03 
6 
9.72 
13.65 
4.89 
11.02 
8.55 
9.55 
5.96 
13.06 
5.27 
17.86 
12.39 
10.29 
6.94 
19.25 
11.58 
8.32 
8.24 
8.96 
Net NPAs/Net Advances 
1999-
2000 
7 
7.80 
12.17 
3.47 
6.95 
8.61 
6.07 
5.28 
9.84 
1.91 
13.81 
16.18 
7.65 
3.61 
9.40 
8.52 
3.17 
8.75 
7.97 
2000-
01 
8 
7.01 
11.21 
2.95 
6.77 
6.72 
7.41 
4.84 
9.72 
1.98 
18.29 
10.07 
7.01 
3.59 
12.27 
6.69 
4.07 
6.30 
6.86 
2001-
02 
9 
6.01 
10.55 
2.45 
5.68 
6.01 
5.81 
3.89 
7.98 
2.31 
16.31 
8.28 
6.32 
3.21 
11.68 
5.27 
4.53 
5.65 
6.26 
200 
2-
03 
10 
4.77 
7.07 
1.79 
4.81 
5.59 
4.83 
3.59 
6.74 
1.65 
11.8 
2 
6.15 
5.23 
1.44 
10.8 
5 
3.80 
4.29 
4.38 
4.91 
20 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
United Bank of India 
Vijaya Bank 
State Bank Group 
State Bank of India 
State Bank of Bikanei 
& Jaipur 
State Bank ol 
Hyderabad 
State Bank of Indore 
State Bank of Mysore 
State Bank of Patiala 
State Bank of 
Saurashtra 
State Bank ol 
Travancore 
Public Sector Banks 
27.63 
11.52 
14.08 
14.25 
16.18 
14.18 
10.80 
13.89 
10.99 
13.71 
14.43 
13.98 
21.51 
10.00 
12.73 
12.93 
12.91 
14.08 
9.16 
12.83 
9.66 
14.57 
11.38 
12.37 
16.16 
9.39 
11.23 
11.95 
9.36 
10.08 
7.18 
12.07 
6.94 
10.18 
9.41 
11.09 
12.15 
6.18 
8.68 
9.34 
8.15 
7.28 
5.53 
10.14 
4.80 
7.32 
6.67 
9.36 
12.85 
6.62 
6.77 
6.41 
10.14 
7.30 
7.55 
8.12 
6.09 
7.86 
8.80 
7.42 
10.47 
6.22 
6.27 
6.03 
7.83 
7.83 
5.91 
7.88 
4.92 
6.87 
7.75 
6.74 
7.94 
6.02 
5.45 
5.64 
5.77 
4.96 
3.58 
7.36 
2.94 
4.95 
5.72 
5.82 
5.52 
2.61 
4.12 
4.49 
4.16 
3.26 
2.66 
5.19 
1.49 
3.53 
3.05 
4.54 
Source: 
1. Balance sheets of respective banks 
2. Returns received from respective banks. 
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Table 5: Movements of Non-Performing Assets (NPAs) of Scheduled Commercial 
Banks (EXCLUDING RRBs): 2000-2003 
Name of the Bank 
State Bank of 
India and 
its Associates 
State Bank oi 
India 
State Bank ol 
Bikaner &. Jaipur 
State Bank of 
Hyderabad 
State Bank of 
Indore 
State Bank of 
Mysore 
State Bank of 
Patiala 
State Bank of 
Saurashtra 
State Bank of 
Travancore 
Nationalised 
Gross NPAs Net NPAs 
As on 
March 
31, 
2000 
(1) 
1524629 
77347 
93572 
31801 
54981 
66953 
46939 
8II08 
As on 
March 
31, 
2001 
(4) 
1587497 
71500 
107529 
32519 
58101 
69476 
56854 
75793 
As on 
March 
31, 
2002 
(1) 
1548585 
58512 
89852 
32010 
62461 
36560 
44325 
7276! 
As on 
March 
31, 
2003 
(4) 
1350607 
58029 
73984 
29525 
56201 
37064 
35434 
63526 
As on 
March 
31, 
2000 
(5) 
628399 
45333 
44420 
21464 
30110 
35179 
25145 
45166 
As on 
March 
31, 
2001 
(6) 
685626 
40967 
55506 
20257 
33230 
33620 
26238 
49597 
As on 
March 
31, 
2002 
(5) 
681028 
34211 
41747 
15346 
36151 
25478 
20357 
42505 
As on 
March 
31, 
2003 
(6) 
618300 
28179 
31539 
13784 
27290 
16065 
16396 
28000 
22 
Banks 
Allahabad Bank 
Andhra Bank 
BankofBaroda 
Bank of India 
Bank of 
Maharashtra 
Canara Bank 
Central Bank of 
India 
Corporation Bank 
Dena Bank 
Indian Bank 
Indian Overseas 
Bank 
Oriental Bank of 
Commerce 
Punjab & Sind 
Bank 
Punjab National 
Bank 
Syndicate Bank 
U C O Bank 
Union Bank of 
India 
United Bank of 
India 
Vijaya Bank 
169416 
45678 
389722 
346400 
71679 
233441 
284300 
43303 
139960 
335457 
162280 
52751 
77680 
312677 
99215 
165141 
188120 
152037 
56719 
182131 
47010 
418572 
343400 
87663 
224289 
325300 
48474 
192826 
235907 
163140 
58576 
102615 
346010 
107460 
128402 
205633 
141115 
59492 
200185 
52414 
448930 
372200 
90642 
211244 
337600 
58705 
199602 
217535 
181854 
95179 
109184 
413986 
129913 
127537 
242048 
121550 
60269 
184150 
58070 
416790 
380400 
95754 
247478 
324400 
65734 
161658 
162982 
189648 
114625 
124689 
498006 
142017 
133265 
238761 
95908 
50554 
100278 
19360 
168631 
220600 
37047 
124376 
155500 
14880 
98317 
132705 
88537 
33642 
44688 
191695 
•• 
68388 
116428 
58724 
31016 
107464 
21902 
185054 
213800 
49767 
134599 
183000 
17119 
128031 
94993 
91758 
39711 
63413 
187111 
65592 
120122 
60230 
35606 
116016 
23723 
191319 
230400 
47971 
128839 
169900 
25343 
128031 
90358 
96751 
45380 
65121 
181001 
99215 
65088 
133836 
54199 
37324 
88698 
20627 
170028 
238200 
45914 
145388 
156200 
19839 
122725 
75495 
91221 
22528 
63947 
152691 
107460 
72359 
125343 
40606 
20581 
Source: 1. Balance sheets of respective banks 
2. Returns received from respective banks. 
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Table 6: Top Ten Public Sector banks - NPAs to Net Advances (1999-00) 
Figures in percentage 
Corporation Bank 
Syndicate Bank 
Andhra Bank 
Oriental Bank of Commerce 
Canara Bank 
State Bank of Patiala 
State Bank of India 
Vijaya Bank 
Bank of Baroda 
Bank of Maharashtra 
State Bank of Hyderabad 
1.91 
3.17 
3.47 
3.61 
5.28 
6.09 
6.41 
6.62 
6.95 
6.97 
7.3 
Top Ten Public Sector banks - NPAs to Net Advances (1999-00) 
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Table 7: Top ten Public sector banks - NPAs to Net Advances (2000-01) 
Figures in percentage 
Corporation Bank 
Andiira Bank 
Oriental Bank of Commerce 
Syndicate Bank 
Canara Bank 
State Bank of Patiala 
State Bank of Indore 
State Bank of India 
Vijaya Bank 
\JCO Bank 
Punjab National Bank 
1.98 
2.95 
3.59 
4.07 
4.84 
4.92 
5.91 
6.03 
6.22 
6.3 
6.69 
Table 8: Top ten Public sector banks - NPAs to Net Advances (2001-02) 
Figures in percentage 
Corporation Bank 
Andhra Bank 
Oriental Bank of Commerce 
Syndicate Bank 
Canara Bank 
State Bank of Patiala 
State Bank of Indore 
State Bank of India / 
Vijaya Bank ' 
UCO Bank 
1.98 
2.95 
3.59 
4.07 
4.84 
4.92 
5.91 
6.03 
6.22 
6.3 
Table 9: Top ten Public Sector banks - NPAs to Net Advances (2002-03) 
Figures in percentage 
State Bank of Patiala 
Corporation Bank { 
State Bank of Indore 
Syndicate Bank 
State Bank of Hyderabad 
Andhra Bank 
State Bank of Saurashtra 
Oriental Bank of Commerce 
State Bank of Bikaner & Jaipur 
State Bank of India 
1.49 
1.91 
2.66 
3.17 
3.26 
3.47 
3.53 
3.61 
4.16 
4.49 
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Top ten Public Sector banks - NPAs to Net Advances (2002-03) 
wmmfmfm 
i 
Jr* L 
state Bank of Corporation State Bank of Syndicate Bank Slate Bank of Andfii^ Bank State Bank of Oriental Bank of State Bank of State Bank of 
Patiaia Bank tndore Hyderaliad Saurashtra Commerce BikaT>er& (ndta 
As per a report compiled by ICRA, the combined net profits of the 27 PSU banks 
increased by 48 per cent to Rs 12,294 crore in the last fiscal. The net profits had 
increased 92.5 per cent in 2001-02. Thus, the net profit of PSU banks increased 2.8 times 
during the last two financial years. Of the total State Bank of India and its associates 
contributed Rs 4,510 crore or 36.7 per cent of the pie, while the share of 19 nationalised 
banks was at 73.3 per cent at Rs 7,784 crore. 
SBI topped the list posting a net profit of Rs 3,105 crore. SBI was followed by Canara 
Bank with a net profit of Rs 1,019 crore, Bank of India (Rs 851 crore), Punjab National 
Bank (Rs 842 crore) and Bank of Baroda (Rs 773 crore), the report compiled by ICRA 
Information, Grading & Research Service said. 
Net NPAs fell drastically from 5.8 to 4.5 per cent. Gross NPAs came down to less than 
10 per cent from 11.1 per cent. The PSU banks were able to reduce their Gross NPAs to 
9.2 per cent at about Rs 54,134 crore while Net NPAs came down to 4.5 per cent Rs 
24,974 crore. Three of the eight SBI and Associate banks had a net NPA exceeding 10 
per cent in 1996-97 but the number reduced to NIL in 2002-03. 
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3.2 ANALYSIS OF NPAs STATISTICS OF RRBS 
Although the co-operative and commercial banks had an impressive record in terms of 
geographical coverage and disbursement of credit, it was observed that the vast majority 
of the poor were generally deprived of credit and other banking facilities. In order to 
provide access to low-cost banking facilities to the poor, a new set-up of banks, viz. 
RRBs, was established in the country to meet exclusively the needs of the weaker 
sections of the rural population, as institutions which "combine the local feel and the 
familiarity with rural problems which the cooperatives possess and ti\e degree of business 
organization, ability to mobilize deposits, access to central money markets and 
modernized outlook which the commercial banks have". 
From a modest beginning with 6 RRBs in 1975, as many as 196 RRBs were operating in 
500 districts with a network of 14,313 branches as on 31 March, 2001 excluding satellite 
branches and extension counters. The branch network comprises 6 metropolitan, 348 
urban, 1875 semi-urban and 12,084 rural branches. RRBs have a large branch network in 
the rural area, which forms nearly 37% of the total rural branch network of all scheduled 
commercial banks. 
RRBs, being an important segment of the Rural Financial Institutions in the country, have 
carved out a special place for themselves in terms of geographical coverage, clientele 
outreach, business volume and contributions for development of rural economy. RRBs 
are focusing their attention on the attainment of sustainable viability, improved customer 
services, new and innovative loan products and diversified business portfolio. RRBs are 
at par with the scheduled commercial banks in respect of priority sector lending, 
investment avenues and credit discipline and transparency. While the performance of 
many RRBs improved significantly, the performance of some of them remains far from 
being satisfactory in view of their tardy business growth and lack of operational viability. 
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RRBs and NPA 
Table 11: gross NPAs OF RRBs 
Year 
As on March 31, 
2002 
As on March 31, 
2003 
Gross NPAs 
306696 
320151 
(Amount 
Gross Advances 
1862922 
2216058 
in Rs. Lakhs) 
Gross NPAs Ratio 
% 
16.46 
14.45 
Source: Annual Accounts of the Banks of respective years for commercial banks And 
NABARD for RRBs. 
Table 12: Top ten Banks: Gross NPA Ratio on 31 March 2002 
Gross NPA Ratio 
0.06 
1.49 
2.38 
3.23 
3.39 
4.02 
4.42 
4.49 
4.51 
4.64 
4.77 
Bank 
PITHORAGARH KSHETRIYA GRAMIN BANK 
JAMNAGAR GRAMIN BK 
NETRAVATI GRAMIN BANK 
MARUDHAR KSHETRIYA GRAMIN BANK 
VIDUR GRAMIN BANK 
KAPURTHALA-FEROZPUR KSHETRIYA GRAMIN BANK 
MALWA GRAMIN BANK 
PANDYAN GRAMIN BANK 
SHRI VENKETESHWARA GRAMIN BANK 
MAR WAR GRAMIN BANK 
SURENDRANAGAR-BHAVNAGAR GRAMIN BANK 
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Table 13: Worst ten Banks: Gross NPA Ratio on 31 March 2002 
Gross NPA Ratio 
41.33 
41.72 
43.67 
43.74 
44.33 
49.69 
49.85 
50.06 
51.6 
69.91 
Bank 
BALLIA KSHETRIYA GRAMIN BANK 
BALASORE GRAMIN BANK 
BHAGALPUR-BANKA KSHETRIYA GRAMIN BANK 
DURG-RAJNANDGAON GRAMIN BANK 
LANGPIDEHANGI RURAL BANK 
TRIPURA GRAMIN BANK 
MONGHYR KSHETRIYA GRAMIN BANK 
ALLAHABAD KSHETRIYA GRAMIN BANK 
VINDHYAVASINI GRAMIN BANK 
ARUNACHAL PRADESH RURAL BANK 
Table 14: Top ten Banks: Gross NPA Ratio on 31 March 2003 
Gross NPA Ratio 
0.04 
1.85 
2.39 
2.71 
3.14 
3.16 
3.26 
3.26 
3.69 
3.95 
4.06 
Bank 
PITHORAGARH KSHETRIYA GRAMIN BANK 
KANPUR KSHETRIYA GRAMIN BANK 
VIDUR GRAMIN BANK 
NETRAVATI GRAMIN BANK 
JAMNAGAR GRAMIN BK 
SHRI VENKETESHWARA GRAMIN BANK 
ADHIYAMAN GRAMIN BANK 
MALWA GRAMIN BANK 
SURENDRANAGAR-BHAVNAGAR GRAMIN BANK 
ALWAR-BHARATPUR ANCHALIK GRAMIN BANK 
PANDYAN GRAMIN BANK 
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Table 15: Worst ten Banks: Gross NPA Ratio on 31 March 2003 
Gross NPA Ratio 
36.97 
37.19 
38.86 
39.05 
39.29 
40.34 
40.37 
41.84 
47.57 
79.02 
Bank 
MONGHYR K.SHETRIYA GRAMIN BANK 
BALLIA KSHETRIYA GRAMIN BANK 
SARAN KSHETRIYA GRAMIN BANK 
SANTHAL PARGANAS GRAMIN BANK 
MARATHWWADA GRAMIN BANK 
VINDHYAVASINI GRAMIN BANK 
BHAGALPUR-BANKA KSHETRIYA GRAMIN BANK 
SURAT-BHARUCH GRAMIN BANK 
ALLAHABAD KSHETRIYA GRAMIN BANK 
ARUNACHAL PRADESH RURAL BANK 
NPAs of all the RRBs have declined from 23.1 per cent as on 31 March 2001 to 16.45 per 
cent as on 31 March 2002. CD Ratio increased to at the level of 42% as on 31 March 
2002 as against 41 per cent as on 31 March 2001. A viability-based review of RRBs 
shows that the loss-incurring RRBs are concentrated in 3 States viz Bihar, Madhya 
Pradesh and Orissa and in four Sponsor Banks viz UCO Bank, SBI, BOI and BOB. Their 
common characteristics included low productivity, high transaction costs, lower CD ratio, 
negative margins, low recovery rates and high NPAs. 
The recovery performance of RRBs have shown a consistent improvement from around 
40% in 1991-92 to 70 % during the year 2001-02. The NPAs of RRBs have also been 
declining in percentage terms and stood at 16% as on 31 March 2002 as against 43% as 
on 31 March 1996 when the norms were first made applicable to the RRBs. 
In order to reduce the stock of NPAs as also to improve the recovery of sticky advances, 
One-Time Settlement Scheme for recovery of NPAs have been introduced in RRBs. The 
scheme was valid up to 31 March 2002 and a sum of Rs. 208 crore have been recovered 
by RRBs under the scheme. 
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3.3 IMPACT OF NPAs ON BANKS' 
"The efficiency of a bank is not always reflected only by the size of its balance sheet but 
by the level of return on its assets. NPAs do not generate interest income for the banks, 
but at the same time banks are required to make provisions for such NPAs fi-om their 
current profits. 
NPAs have a deleterious effect on the return on assets in several ways -
• They erode current profits through provisioning requirements 
• They result in reduced interest income 
• They require higher provisioning requirements affecting profits and accretion to 
capital funds and capacity to increase good quality risk assets in future, and 
• They limit recycling of funds, set in asset-liability mismatches, etc 
There is at times a tendency among some of the banks to understate the level of NPAs in 
order to reduce the provisioning and boost up bottom lines. It would only postpone the 
In the context of crippling effect on a bank's operations in all spheres, asset quality has 
been placed as one of the most important parameters in the measurement of a bank's 
performance under the CAMELS supervisory rating system of RBI. 
Impact on Profitability 
Between 01.04.93 to 31.03.2001 Commercial banks incurred a total amount of Rs.31251 
Crores towards provisioning NPA. This has brought Net NPA to Rs.32632 Crores or 
6.2% of net advances. To this extent the problem is contained, but at what cost? This 
costly remedy is made at the sacrifice of building healthy reserves for future capital 
adequacy. The enormous provisioning of NPA together with the holding cost of such 
non-productive assets over the years has acted as a severe drain on the profitability of the 
PSBs. In turn PSBs 
are seen as poor performers and unable to approach the market for raising additional 
capital. Equity issues of nationalised banks that have already tapped the market are now 
quoted at a discount in the secondary market. Other banks hesitate to approach the market 
31 
CHAPTER 4 ANALYSIS OF NPAs STATISTICS 
to raise new issues. This has alternatively forced PSBs to borrow heavily from the debt 
market to build Tier II Capital to meet capital adequacy norms putting severe pressure on 
their profit margins, else they are to seek the bounty of the Central Government for 
repeated Recapitalisation. 
Considering the minimum cost of holding NPAs at 7% p.a. (reckoning average cost of 
funds at 6% plus 1% service charge) the net NPA of Rs.32632 Crores absorbs a recurring 
holding cost of Rs.2300 Crores annually. Considering the average provisions made for 
the last 8 years, which works out to average of Rs.3300 crores from annum, a sizeable 
portion of the interest income is absorbed in servicing NPA. NPA is not merely non-
remunerative. It is also cost absorbing and profit eroding. 
In the context of severe competition in the banking industry, the weak banks are at 
disadvantage for leveraging the rate of interest in the deregulated market and securing 
remunerative business growth. The options for these banks are lost. "The spread is the 
bread for the banks". This is the margin between the cost of resources employed and the 
return therefrom. In other words it is gap between the return on funds deployed(Interest 
earned on credit and investments) and cost of funds employed(Interest paid on deposits). 
When the interest rates were directed by RBI, as heretofore, there was no option for 
banks. But today in the deregulated market the banks decide their lending rates and 
borrowing rates. In the competitive money and capital Markets, inability to offer 
competitive market rates adds to the disadvantage of marketing and building new 
business. 
In the face of the deregulated banking industry, an ideal competitive woricing is reached, 
when the banks are able to earn adequate amount of non-interest income to cover their 
entire operating expenses i.e. a positive burden. In that event the spread factor i.e. the 
difference between the gross interest income and interest cost will constitute its operating 
profits. Theoretically even if the bank keeps 0% spread, it will still break even in terms of 
operating profit and not return an operating loss. The net profit is the amount of the 
operating profit minus the amount of provisions to be made including for taxation. On 
account of the burden of heavy NPA, many nationalised banks have little option and they 
are unable to lower lending rates competitively, as a wider spread is necessitated to cover 
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cost of NPA in the face of lower income from off balance sheet business yielding non-
interest income.The following working results of Corporation bank an identified well 
managed nationalised banks for the last two years and for the first nine months of the 
current financial year, will be revealing to prove this statement-
Table 16. (pait-l) 
CoipiGS|tti^ -.. Baiik 
^fmHmmaxi mdicator 
:...Perfonnance - <» 
.^Amount in CrQi£S]| 
A ,».>>.:• "i 
EaMin^i'Ddri^lijiterest '^ Z^^OteSJs 1292^"."^ 285; 
3 0 p 5 ^ 34|^6. , 2 8 0 ^ Op&esMgixp&x^ 
Difference 33;ir -49.27 533 . 
Non-interest income fully absorbs the operating expenses of this bank in the current 
financial year for the first 9 months. In the last two financial years, though such income 
has substantially covered the operating expenses (between 80 to 90%) there is still a 
deficit left. Now what are the interest earnings and expenses of Corporation Bank during 
this period? 
rable:-^l|-(part-l) Corporation Bank -Interest Earnings 
Performance indicator 
Earnings— Iint««st Income 
Exp.-Iitfe^est e}i^€nses 
Interest spread 
Operating Profit 
Provisions 
Net Profit 
2000 
160439 
1146.09 
45830 
425.12 
192.68 
232.44 
Year 
ended \, 
Mar. . .;: 
2001 
1804.54 
1223.21 
581.33 
482.21 
270.22 
261.84 
9 montiis 
AprJdlcr 
2001 
1458.33 
981.45 
476.88 
532.06 
219.48 
262.73 
The strength of Corporation Bank is identified by the following positive features: 
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It is worthwhile to compare the aggregate figures of the 19 Nationalised banks for the 
year ended March 2001, as published by RBI in its Report on trends and progress of 
banking in India. 
Table 18- Nationalised banks operational statistics. 
(Amount-in Crores) Performance indicator 
Year ended Yea|{|e»ided 
iMar, 2000 |Ma^[0O|| 
Earnings - Non-interest 56^.42 
OpCTating expenses>^;; 
a n * •-
Difference 7$89.45 1- lOTi;»:i4 
Earnings — interest income 50234.01 5696^^11 
Exp.-Interest expenses 35477.41 387g0;€4 
Interest spread 14756.60 18177.47 
Iritt: On Recap bonds 1797.88 1795.48 
Operating Profit 5405.27 6257.85 
Provisions 4766.15 5958.24 
Net Profit 639.12 299.61 
Interest on Recapitalisation Bonds is a income earned from the Government, who had 
issued the Recapitalisation Bonds to the weak banks to sustain their capital adequacy 
under a bail out package. The statistics above show the other weaknesses of the 
nationalised banks in addition to the heavy burden they have to bear for servicing NPA 
by way of provisioning and holding cost as under :-
Their operating expenses are higher due to surplus manpower employed. Wage costs to 
total assets is much higher to PSBs compared to new private banks or foreign banks. 
Their earnings from sources other than interest income are meagre. This is due to failure 
to develop off balance sheet business through innovative banking products. 
How NPA Affects the Liquidity of the Nationalised Banks? 
Though nationalised banks (except Indian Bank) are able to meet norms of Capital 
Adequacy, as per RBI guidelines, the fact that their net NPA in the average is as much as 
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7% is a potential threat for them. RBI has indicated the ideal position as Zero percent Net 
NPA. Even granting 3% net NPA within limits of tolerance the nationalised banks are 
holding an uncomfortable burden at 7.1% as at March 2001. They have not been able to 
build additional capital needed for business expansion through internal generations or by 
tapping the equity market, but have resorted to II-Tier capital in the debt market or 
looking to recapitalistion by Government of India. 
How NPA Affects the Outlook of Bankers towards Credit Delivery 
The fear of NPA permeates the psychology of bank managers in the PSBs in entertaining 
new projects for credit expansion. In the world of banking the concepts of business and 
risks are inseparable. Business is an exercise of balancing between risk and reward. 
Accept justifiable risks and implement de-risking steps. Without accepting risk, there can 
be no reward. The psychology of the banks today is to insulate themselves with zero 
percent risk and turn lukewarm to fresh credit. This has affected adversely credit growth 
compared to growth of deposits, resulting a low C/D Ratio around 50 to 54% for the 
industry.The fear psychosis also leads to excessive security-consciousness in the 
approach towards lending to the small and medium sized credit customers. There is 
insistence on provision of collateral security, sometimes up to 200% value of the 
advance, and consequently due to a feeling of assumed protection on account of holding 
adequate security (albeit over-confidence), a tendency towards laxity in the standards of 
credit appraisal comes to the fore. It is well known that the existence of collateral security 
at best may convert the credit extended to productive sectors into an investment against 
real estate, but will not prevent the account turning into NPA. Further blocked assets and 
real estate represent the most illiquid security and NPA in such advances has the 
tendency to persist for a long duration. 
Nationalised banks have reached a dead-end of the tunnel and their future prosperity 
depends on an urgent solution of this hovering threat. 
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4.0 REASONS FOR MOUNTING NPAs 
Banking is not 100% safe business. The entire money lent by a way of advance may not 
come back, as a certain percent of the total advance is bound to be lost or become 
irrecoverable. It may also be pointed out that the government has not been able to 
implement the recommendations the of the various committees. With regard to the 
establishment of the Asset Reconstruction fund (AFR), bank need to resort to other 
measures to reduce their NPAs. These are recovery effort, rephrasing of loans, negotiated 
settlement, rehabilitation of sick viable units, mergers or acquisitions of units, legal 
actions, etc. but banks have always adopted a lukewarm attitude in adopting any of these 
measures in the absence of any long range planning in banks. In fact the Board of 
Directors of many banks just pays sceint regard to recovery of the dues with seriousness 
and the amount of dedication has needed for such efforts. It is always more convenient to 
adopt the line of least resistance. The result is that nobody bothers as to why banks 
should be put to loss and no one wants to djsplease the defaulters who are either vote 
banks for ruling party or they are influemial people with political clout, or perhaps 
because banks officials are hand-in-glover with defaulters. 
BAD AND doubtful debts of banks, palled non-performing assets or NPAs in banking 
jargon, have been attracting wide attention for varied reasons. Some of the reasons for the 
burgeoning NPAs are: Bank officers do not know how to lend and are also corrupt. 
A major portion of bad debts arose out of lending to the priority sector, at the dictates of 
politicians and bureaucrats. If only banks had monitored their loans effectively, the bad 
debt problem could have been contained, if not eliminated. 
The top management of the banks were forced by politicians and bureaucrats to throw 
good money after bad in the cas^ of unscrupulous borrowers. Many big borrowers 
defaulted only due to the reces^on in the economy. The absence of proper bankruptcy 
laws and the dilatory legal procedures in enforcing security rights are the root cause of 
bad debts in banks. 
These and similar views are freely expressed by knowledgeable people in the field. All 
the above statements have some elements of truth. It is like six blind persons looking at 
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an elephant and describing its physical characteristics. Unless the problem is identified 
properly, no remedial action is feasible. 
In a layman's perception, NPA formation in a bank is paradoxical. Unlike moneylenders 
who on several occasions lend money without any collateral, the advances made by the 
banks ^^e generally backed by some kind of collateral, which can be liquidated in case of 
default. This collateral is in fact insisted on while making an advance to guard against the 
possibility of default. But the problem arises in several cases of default when some of 
these collaterals could not be acquired or liquidated by the bank to realise the loss 
involved. This inability was primarily duc/to institutional constraints, such as 
inappropriate legal framework, political interference or the general non-compliance 
attitude of the borrowing community. In ao^ition to that, the existence of inadequately 
formed asset market might have aggravated the problem further. High transaction costs of 
operating in such a market also may be another reason. 
Even if we accept that NPA is a fact of life, so far as banking practices are concerned, 
then ideally there should be no reason why one should be worried about it. A bank can 
obtain the desired rate of return through properly adjusting the rate of interest on different 
categories of loans/advances in accordance with their risk profile. If the sample size is 
large enough for different categories of advances, which is in fact true for most of the 
Indian PSBs, the realised return, and desired return on the total asset of the bank would 
coincide. The loss due to NPA would exactly be compensated by higher interest earning 
in specific risk categories. In other words, high incidence of NPA need not necessarily 
affect the profitability of the bank. In fact, both can go together. This is because high 
profits can be earned only at the cost effacing high risk i.e. generating high NPA. 
There is no problem with a moderate NPA as it can be taken care of by differential rates 
of interest on advances made to different sectors. However, 
there is a limit to which the rate of interest can be increased in order to reflect the high 
profile of an asset category. If NPA becomes very high, it will be difficult to deal with its 
aftermath by means of an increase in rate of interest. A rise in the rate of interest may go 
against the central bank's dictum. It may also lead to adverse selection a la Akerlof 
(1970). If the increment in the rate of interest were very high, the problem would be 
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aggravated by further increase in default. This occurs through two routes. Firstly, at a 
high rate of interest, a section among borrowers borrows with an intention to default. 
Secondly, an increase in the probability of default would take place either because 
individuals take more risk when the interest rate is higher. One may add that if the 
demand for loans is inelastic, raising the rate of interest may not reduce the demand for 
credit. It may create a category of genuine defaulters whose margin is squeezed. This 
poses a limit to the use of the tool of raising the interest rate to overcome NPA problems. 
In case of large NPA accumulation by a bank, it may also react by decreasing its 
exposure to the particular sector generating high NPA and changing its composition of 
advances. However, this is also not without problems. With change in the composition of 
advances and increase in advances to non-risky sectors, rate of interest offered to these 
sectors will fall. This is currently happening to Indian banks which when faced with 
NPAs originating from industries affected by recession are increasing their investment in 
government securities on the one hand and wooing the household sector with lower 
interest rate on personal loans on the other. 
However, apart from ceiling on interest rate or statutory restrictions on interest rates for 
some categories of loans irrespective of their risk profile, there may exist genuine 
problems of estimation of risks. Risks may not be time independent. They vary with the 
changes in overall business conditions. They may increase with economic slowdown and 
decrease with economic upturn. In addition to this there may also exist the problem of 
moral hazard or intentional default, principal 
agency problems where managers satisfy their own interest without considerations to the 
depositors/shareholders, political intervention and contagious effects in case of non-
recovery, and all this may aggravate the problem of NPA. In fact, many of these factors 
proved very critical for the Indian PSBs, raising the NPA to an alarming level. This 
indicates that the role of evaluation and monitoring by the banks and fransparency in 
banking operations assumes primary importance. 
For analytical simplicity, the occurrence of default, in the Indian context, may be split 
into two components: random and the non-random components. The random component 
of default is assumed to be stochastic in nature. The different economic or commercial 
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activities involve different levels of risks that are faced by borrowers with varied ability 
to sustain. Consequently, these risks are translated into NPAs through default. The 
relevant parameters can be estimated with a high degree of confidence when the number 
of borrowers in different categories of advances is reasonably high. 
First, the facts. The total NPA of all scheduled commercial banks in India had swollen 
from Rs. 47,300 crores to Rs. 70,904 crores during the five years from March 1997 to 
March 2002, as per the Reserve Bank's annual reports on trends and progress of banks in 
India. 
Against these, banks had provided for Rs. 35,358 crores or roughly half the total by 2002. 
Still, the net NPA was as high as Rs. 35,546 crores and represented 5.5 per cent of the 
total advances; this is high compared to around 2 per cent for banks in advanced 
countries. 
One extenuating feature for Indian banks is that the NPA amounted to a mere 2.3 per cent 
of total assets. This is because advances comprise less than 50 per cent of total assets, 
with the banks having invested heavily in government securities in India. With banks 
required to keep their own capital and reserves at 
a minimum of 9 per cent of the advances portfolio, the NPA level is not such as to cause 
concern about the health of the banking system. 
Let us now examine the reasons for the higher levels of NPA in Indian banks 
There are some important reasons for the mounting NPAs. These are as follows: 
1. The Legal Environment: 
Foundations of corporate governance mechanisms are the laws that provide protection to 
suppliers of finance and legal institution that enforce these laws, the former determine the 
power of the suppliers of finance and latter the speed and efficiency with which they can 
be used. A RBI report qoutes a paper brought out by Fitch IBCA- an international agency 
which places the blame for high NPAs on legal system. The paper' states that" The Indian 
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legal system is sympathetic towards the borrowers and work against the bank interest. 
The result of survey on NPAS in Indian bakns showed that 27 PSBs and 6 Private sector 
banks filed siuts for the recovery of 46.38% of their NPAs in 1999, but were able to 
recover only 4.32% and the significant portion of suites have been pending for more than 
a decade. The legal system for recovery of is longer when cases are reffered to the Board 
of Industrial and Financial Reconstruction (BIFR). This is because special provision of 
the sick Industrial Companies Act (SICA), 1985 bar banks from taking actions in such 
caes. It has been seen that the foreign banks have lower NPAs. But in India their NPAs 
are higher than the percentage in their home countries or the ones in low risk countries. 
They also blame the judicial system in India for it. 
It may also be mentioned that there is no social stigma attached to the defaulters, 
especially wilful defaulters. Further, it is becoming increasingly futile to keep the 
litigation alive for long, as it is only a drain on resources. These legal procedures are 
highly time consuming as the matters get invariably delayed with law courts granting 
adjournments one after another for any small reason. More money is spent than what is 
hoped to be recovered by pursuing these cases in the courts of law. Despite most of the 
loans being backed by security, banks are unable to enforce their claims on the collateral, 
when loans turn non-performing, and therefore loan recoveries remain insignificant. Un-
sustainability of litigation in cases where borrowers are neither paying up nor likely to do 
so makes provisioning against these NPAs a losing proposition. The bank may feel that a 
write-off against such loans would help clean up the balance sheet and induce greater 
transparency. Thus there may be a tendency to write off a small amount of advances in 
the face of prohibitive legal and administrative cost and inordinate delay in final 
settlement. 
2. Public Ownership of Banks and Market Discipline: 
Implicit guarantees provided by the Government to the banks for their ending to the 
corporate sector led to inadequate credit appraisal and risk management by banks. This 
created a financial sector vunrelable to external shocks. The public and the de facto the 
contro rests with the bureaucrates contro state firm's, these bureaucrates have control 
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rights but no right to the cash flow generated by the firm, resulting in litle concern for 
performance. The lack of managerial incentives to control NPAs in public sector banks 
owing to state ownership also createds the danger that banks may not take use of investor 
friendly laws and institutions. 
The Indian commercial banks suffer from this syndrome. A market mechanism to deal 
this problem is to all the public sector banks to approach private investor for equity. 
Already concerns about high NPAs level the stock market in the recent past. The share 
prices of major banks have been fallen significantly. 
a) Lack of organisational learning in the bank - repeated lending to same person or 
group of persons with similar dubious characteristics 
Organisational learning on the part of the bank is very important in controlling the growth 
of NPA. It is obvious that with the experience of repeated lending over a period of time to 
varieties of borrowers, a bank can identify a particular type of borrower who is more 
likely to default. But in practice it fails to learn from the past. Due to several constraints, 
whether internal or external, like political interference, it cannot bar these potential 
defaulters. For instance, loans have been extended to 
industries in the negative list circulated by IDBl, department of industries and RBI. 
existing accounts which have gone irregular, i.e. ever-greening of accounts . 
a party which is irregular on existing accounts in a different branch of the same bank. 
several projects with promoters or directors with doubtful integrity. 
b) Lack of vision of bank in sanctioning, reviewing and enhancing credit limits 
While examining long term viability, both foresight as well as proper scrutiny is 
lacking on the part of the bank. Inefficient decisions have resulted in many newly bom 
projects turning sick or closing down. There are instances in which instalments and 
interest have become due before the commencement of commercial production. Such 
accounts are considered as NPA, which reflects improper scrutiny and failure in 
considering moratorium period on a realistic basis. 
41 
CHAPTER 5 Reasons for mounting NPAs 
3. Political Interference: 
In Indian banking system has been extensively misused for political reasons in the past. 
Bed debts are a legacy of this misuse. The NPAs in priority sector advances of PSBs are 
46-49% of their overall NPAs while priority sector advances form only 3-32% of their 
total advances. In addition to large-scale loan 
write-offs ordered by politicians promote a culture on indiscipline and lawlessness among 
borrowers. This adds to the problems of banks already functioning in a legal 
environment. Political leaders/organisations wield enormous power over the banks in 
granting loans to particular borrowers. It pays the political leaders to encourage default 
by the borrowers, in the absence of an efficient legal system. For instance, rural 
panchayats are responsible for recommending loans, but once the loan is disbursed, these 
rural political bodies take no initiative to ensure that the loan is serviced and repaid. 
There are many instances where big companies received a large volume of loans under 
political influence and were able to escape punishment 
after default. Examples include UB Engineering promoted by Vijay Mallya, an MP in the 
Rajya Sabha and Mukand Steel promoted by Viren Shah, current governor of West 
Bengal. 
4. Competition, Liberalization and Gambling: 
Abolition of license raj and hotting up of competition in the liberalizing Indian economy 
has changed the complexion of the some of the earlier sought after borrowers, some of 
the renowned industrial houses are on the brink of extinction. The commercial banks 
have now been providing for bad loans of the advances portfolio handled by them in the 
past as the proud bankers of the then reputed companies. The fast changing technology 
has thrown out of the market some of the companies which could not manage to keep 
themselves in tune with the requirement of rapid technological advances and those 
companies have to close down their shutters. Thus the transition period of Indian 
Economy which has been opening up after liberalization will contribute to the new NPAs. 
Now every bank has the option of investing in a "prudent asset" that yield relatively little 
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or in a inefficient "gambling asset" that yield high return if gamble pays of and impose 
cost on depositors and deposit ensure if it fail. 
5. Inadequate Management Risk Practices: 
The level of NPAs varies greatly among banks. It is obvious that some banks are better 
able to manage credit risk in the fact of existing constraints than others. This under scores 
the importance of internal, risk management system in the bank. Risk management 
should be proactive rather than reactive. The appraisal criteria of the commercial; banks 
may not be sophisticated, however in case of foreign banks, they are only selective in 
granting credit but are concise and focus on appraisal system and faster in delivery of 
credit. Appraisal management is not a competent enough in commercial banks to identify 
the viable and non-viable projects. 
6. Lack of Prudential Regulation: 
Risk management practices can be effective only when financial statements presents 
accurate picture of level; of the risk. The income recognition norms being followed by 
bank prior to 1992-93 involved recognition of income earned on bad debts in their book 
on an accrual basis. Thus their financial statement does not reflect the level of bad debts 
and presented and misleading rosy picture of their health. This allows the situation to 
degenerate considerably before it was detected. 
Sometime advances would run bad due to wrong policies or procedure or due to absence 
of prudential norms. Credit of hundred commendable decisions is washed away by one 
incorrect small judgment. 
7. Diversion of Funds by Borrowers: 
Because of increasing competition and changing economic policy and environment 
borrowers are diversifying their business. Diversion of funds is also for modernization, 
setting up new projects, helping or promoting sister concerns and if all these techniques 
failed it will generate the NPAs. 
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8. Inefficient Monitoring over tbie Use of Funds: 
After granting of loans most of the time bank official is not bother about its use by the 
borrowers. They don't take interest to know that it isuse in right direction or not. It 
depends on the will of the manager to the monitor ij^r not and borrowers are diversifying 
their business in hope of better and more return^ 
9. Lack of Effective Follow Up Due Largjer Number of Accounts: 
Because of large number of lending cases it is not possible for the banks limited staff to 
follow each and every borrower that he is using the fund properly or not. 
10. The high share of lending to the priority sector, consisting of primarily 
agriculture and SSI, contributed to NPAs in a big way: 
The agricultural sector achieved a moderate growth (3.12 percent per annum) in the 
1980s which was slightly reduced in the 1990s (2.98 percent |<er annum). Similarly, the 
SSI sector's performance was also impressive. It was as h(gii_as 11.63 percent in the 
eighties, which declined to 8.59 percent in 1990-2001. NPAs in these sectors cannot be 
attributed to their poor performance. 
However, in agriculture, price jirash of commercial crops after harvest is a common 
phenomenon, which leads to loan defaults by the farmers. Sometimes, failures of the high 
valued crops, like cotton due to pests attack or other reasons, may lead to default by 
farmers as recently noted in oiaijy states of India. 
However, the explanation of NPAs was not in terms of their performance, but in terms of 
the indiscriminate choice of the borrowers that contributed to the high incidence of 
default. There is some element of truth in it as this sector's share of NPAs is more than 
that of loans as in 1993. Nevertheless, over time its share in loan declined but the decline 
in the share of NPAs was faster than the share of the loans (Mukherjee, 2003). The 
growth rate of NPAs of the priority sector was 3.9 percent which was much lower than 
that of the non-priority sector (6.4 percent) during the period 1993 - 2001. The relative 
improvement of the priority 
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sector's NPAs in the later part of the 1990s may be attributed to the more cautious 
approaches and policies of the banks and their exertion of choice in selecting borrowers 
helped to motivate the borrowers, who are g^n^rally small, to repay the loans in due time. 
Using the same logic one may say that/in the non-priority sector it is neither possible to 
deny loans to a large number of/big borrowers nor to motivate them to repay. In 
consequence NPAs due to the nonwriority sector are growing disproportionately. 
The banks NPAs in priority sector have increased in recent years. Government is treating 
with them leniently because of political interest. And to oblige government gives them 
relief and concessions to unproductive. Priority sector projects. These are causing 
increase in NPAs. 
11. Absence of Adequate Security: 
Security against the loan is not adequate to meet the demand of lender in case of default. 
In various cases immovable property as security kept by borrower is not easily liquidated 
in the market and the borrower take the stay order from the court on its sale. So the bad 
debt is not recoverable and this situation is mounting NPAs. 
12. Strained Labor Relations in Lending Firm: 
In various cases it has been seen tljat^ained labor relation in the lending firm stopped 
the production work and it affetts the economic condition of the company. If the dispute 
is not resolved immediately and production work restored it will cause increase in unused 
fund hence increase in NPAs. 
Rising NPAs phenomenon is to be attributed to the government is so far as Board of 
Directors is not professionalism. Banking ej^r ts do not get nominated to the board of 
directors nor in their any autonomy granted to the board. The generalist representative of 
the government rules the roots. The question, who is responsible for sanctioning of loans 
that have become NPAs, is nobody's 
concern. Fixing responsibility for bad decisions is totally absent instead very liberal 
write-off of bad debts is approved without betting an eyelid in order to reduce NPAs. 
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13. Wrong lending decisions 
One of the primary reasoparror NPA could be that the lending decision was, ab initio, 
incorrect. Seasoned bimkers would scoff at this as a preposterous statement, but the 
reality has to be faced. 
A major portion of bank lending is to industries and trade; this segment accounted for 
over 53 per cent of gross bank credit, excluding loans to food procurement agencies of 
governments, as at the end of March 2002, vide RBI data. In lending to these borrowers, 
bankers have to releam a lot. 
Till the early 1960s, bankers lent only to traditional companies owned by "respected" 
business groups and relied primarily on the credentials of the group. The emergence of 
small scale industries and the gradual opening up of the economy changed the scenario 
with many new entrepreneurs on the scene and bankers had to learn newer ways of 
assessment and appraisal. 
In 1974, an expert committee under the chairmanship of Prakash Tandon rewrote the 
policies and procedures of lending to industries by banks. These were implicitly followed 
by all banks under the directions of RBI. While the 'norms' prescribed by the Tandon 
Committee were appropriate for the conditions in 1970s, banks were following them even 
after 20 years. 
In the late4990s the RBI freed banks from the shackles of the norms, but banks are yet to 
get gw of their reliance on norms and arithmetical formulae and, instead of understanding 
and interpreting the numbers judiciously, they 
converted a tool into a talisman. Appraisal of credit needs of industrial units and business 
concerns cannot be put into a straitjacket and banks have to releam the tricks of the trade. 
At present, either they deny needed credit to small and medium enterprises because of the 
norms or go overboard in relation to their bigger customers who enjoy "corporate loans" 
at ridiculously low interest rates at 5 to 6 per cent p.a. In their obsession with financial 
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data, bank officers do not seem to probe vital aspects such as the need for and the purpose 
for which credit is needed. 
14. Incomplete contract 
Contracts are inherently incomplete as it is difficult to specify all the modalities and 
the terms and conditions prior to signing of a contract. This is seen to be all the more true 
in the case of fmancial ti:iuisactions in the PSBs where many disputes emerged regarding 
the magnitude of the interest amount dues. For instance, changes in the banking practice 
of applying and fixing of interest from quarterly to monthly caused confusion regarding 
the exact annual interest rates and thereby interest bills. Already a large number of 
litigations involving a sizable amount of bank money is pending in the court, for which 
neither interest nor the principal is forthcoming. '^ 
15. Low level of expertise 
Another factor that can contribute to the low level of expertise in many big public sector 
banks is the constant rbtation of duties among officers and the apparent lack of training in 
lending principles for the loan officers. 
Being dictated to by the bureaucrats in the Government, public sector banks are asked to 
frown upon sDecialisation of officers in any particular branch of banking; this also makes 
it hard for developing a fully trained cadre of lending officers. 
If the public sector has to compete in the fierce financial markets, they have to 
create and nurture a good cadre of officers in various disciplines. Corruption, as a cause 
for NPA, is, in the author's opinion, not a serious one. The number of officers who are not 
scrupulously honest will not be large in banks; in any case, unlike government 
departments, banks are not monopolies in rendering service and customers will not 
tolerate undue levels of corruption. 
Many among the intelligentsia, who belong to the service class, still believe that 
the priority sector, comprising the small trader, industrialist and the farmer, is responsible 
for the NPA problem. 
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This arises from the notion that such small people are either more dishonest than the 
larger borrowers or are more prone to business failure. While a small 
business/industry/farmer is more susceptible to recessionary conditions in the economy, 
they are certainly not more dishonest than the bigger one$ 
16. High incidence of NPAs are a result of/Slowdown of the economy, particularly 
industrial recession 
The macro factors that are popularly adduced to explain high incidence of NPAs 
include slow down of the economy, particularly in the industrial sector, liberalisation, the 
South East Asian Crisis, effect of globalisation on domestic industries and cyclical 
factors. It is difficuh to isolate the impact of liber^ization or South East Asian crisis on 
NPAs, but one can relate the latter to economic slow down. During 1993 and 2001, gross 
NPAs increased at a rate of 5.01 percent per annum. The growth rate of GDP at factor 
cost in India was reasonably high (5.52/per cent per annum) during the 1980s which 
accelerated in the 1990s to reach 6.12 E<ercent per annum. The growth performance of the 
industry sector was even better in the 1980s and 1990s - although it marginally declined 
from 7.65 percent per annum to 6 . ^ percent per annum between the two decades. It 
seems that the stagnation/recession hypothesis of NPAs is not corroborated by the factual 
position. However it may happen that some specific industries stagnated and contributed 
to high NPAs which is discussed below. 
17. Stagnation in specific industries with large share of loans contributed to NPAs 
As on March 31, 2001,^dustry shared 43.58 percent of the outstanding credit of the 
PSBs. Textiles share^.lO percent of which cotton textiles shared 2.37 percent. Basic 
metal and metal pnzwiucts shared 5.84 percent, within this group iron and steel shared 4.22 
percent. PersonalUoans including housing shared a very high proportion of the total 
outstanding credit (11.73 percent). According to the estimates of Uchikawa (2001), the 
growth performance of the textiles industries was rather slow in the 1980s (4.8 percent) 
which turned to be negative in the 1990s (-1.1-percent). Wood industries witnessed a 
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negative growth in the 1980s (-2.1 percent) which however made some improvement in 
the 1990s. The industries that did not perform so well over these decades, include 
leather, beverage and metals industri^^asgupta undertook a study on fmancial risk, 
measured in terms of Altman's Z m Score, on several industry groups for the years from 
1993-94 to 1999-2000. It wasyobserved that textiles, paper, pig iron and sponge iron, steel 
and castings had high risks throughout the period. Cement, sharing the major part of the 
non-metallic mineral products, started becoming riskier after 1996-97. Leather products 
were able to overcome their fmancial risks and metal products, which were earlier not 
risky, have become so since 1997-98. 
It is therefore evident that selected groups of industries became a major source of NPA 
accumulation. Steel being so important in this regard, one needs to mention that with the 
Initiation of liberalisation and globalisation and state emphasis on infrastructure building, 
this industry made massive investment for capacity building. However, for various 
reasons, it could neither raise exports nor face adequate growth of domestic demand. The 
unfulfilled expectations raised by liberalisation, contributed towards NPA formation. 
18. NPAs are gener^d as a result of lending to more risl<y ventures in search of 
higher profits 
One may argue that the banks attempt to earn a high rate of profit by taking risky lending 
with high interest rates and the high NPA is a necessary outcome. Under such 
circumstances it is expected that both the NPAs and interest earnings would increase or 
move together. In order to test this association a simple correlation exercise has been 
undertaken between gross NPAs to advances ratios and gross interest earnings to 
advances ratios across PSBs for the years from 1995 to 2001 
Apart from the above reasons, there are a number of typical reasons leading to emergence 
of the NPA problem in the case of Indian PSBs. Some of these include malfunctioning of 
the institutional environment, captured by its economic, political, legal, social 
manifestations. The other reasons include use of the bank as an instrument of public 
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policy, incompatibility of bank's interest with certain policy instruments as well as the 
change in the economic regime. It is also argued that new laws on environment and social 
security not envisagd at the time of appraisal have also contributed to accumulation of 
NPA. 
19. Use of bank as an instrument of public policy 
A number of examples may be ci|ed-4ft order to show that the use of PSBs as an 
instrument of public policy has helped accumulation of NPAs. Lending under populist 
schemes like loan melas, directed lending to certain sectors like mini-steel, mini-peqier, 
mini-cement units, sugar and cotton spinning co-operatives are examples. 
20. Use of certain policy instruments cutting across interest of banks 
Indecision on exiting out of bad loans through OTS due to fear of investigating 
agencies like CBI, CVC-have all contributed to worsening the NPA situation of the 
banks. The banks are owned by the government, which brings them under the purview of 
CVC, and business decisions are given a go by for adhering to procedures. The private 
and foreign banks are outsidg^the purview of the CVC, which makes them recover and 
write off at a faster pace. BIFR is an escape route easily available to a wilful defaulter. 
Once the case is registered with BIFR, the bank's option to proceed legally is closed. For 
quite a few corporate houses, reaching to BIFR has become the most convenient route to 
avoid bank litigation. Over the years the process of revival of sick industries has led to a 
situation in which the corporate houses do not mind blackmailing the lenders with the 
threat of taking refuge under the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act. The 
BIFR experience shows how it has become a safe haven for companies that want to deter 
a feasible solution such as closure and prefer to be parasites on public money. There is a 
proposal to repeal Sick Industrial Companies Act that will prevent defaulting companies 
from taking refuge in BIFR. 
21. Intentional misuse of settlepient policy of RBI 
RBI has initiated a pplit^of settlement of loans with the borrowers, where an element 
of concession is granted to the defaulters. This has created a moral hazard problem where 
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even the smaller and less influential borrowers are refusing to pay off their loan and 
increasing a developing a tendency to misuse of settlement policy of RBI. 
In all forums of interactions the global multilateral institutions and rating agencies had 
with RBI and the Government, directed lending concept gets quoted as an important 
attribute and a contributory factor for the build up of NPAs in banks in India. It is a 
different matter that RBI and the Government are accused of soft attitude towards banks 
which do not fulfill the prescribed targets for priority sector lending, particularly 
agriculture and small scale sector. To put matters on a proper perspective, I thought I 
should share some information regarding the contribution by various segments of 
borrowers to the NPA stock of public sector banks. The picture in the following table as 
on March 31, 2001,1 am sure, is self-revealing. 
Table 19. NPAs in different sector 
Borrowing segment-wise distribution of 
gross NPAs 
Public sector units 
Large Industries 
Medium industries 
Other non priority sectors 
Agriculture 
Small scale industries 
Other priority sectors 
Total 
Gross NPAs as on March 31,2001 
Amount 
(Rs. crores) 
1334.05 
11498.10 y ^ 
8658.69 
9516.62 
7311.40 
10284.97 
6169.33 
54773.16 
Percentage to 
total NPAs 
2>r^ ^ 
20.99 
15.81 
17.37 
13.35 
18.7«^-
11.26 
«)o:tro 
I do understand that recovery of NPAs under priority sector advances particularly 
to agriculture and small-scale industries is sometimes hampered by externalities. Further, 
such NPAs are also spread over a large number of accounts and for small amounts. 
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However, one fails to understand the reluctance of large borrowers to honour their 
repayment obligations. In many cases, failure of banks to take effective action against 
some of the defaulting large corporate borrowers was also noticed. This is a factor which 
prompted the Hon'ble Finance Minister in his recent meeting with CMDs of public sector 
banks to set a time frame for filing suits against such borrowers to facilitate public 
disclosure of defaults by big borrowers in the banking system. 
Lack of effective co-ordination between banks and financial institutions in respect of 
large value projects does contribute to the emergence of NPAs even at the 
implementation stage. RBI had, in February 2000,drawn up certain ground rules in this 
regard in consultation with banks, financial institutions and IBA and circulated the same 
among banks and financial institutions for implementation. 
Susceptibility of the sanctioning authorities to external pressure, failings of the CEOs 
and the ineffectiveness of the Board to check his ways also contributed in no small 
measure to the unusual build up of NPAs in some of the banks. 
One of the most prominent causes for NPAs, as often observed by RBI Inspectors, is 
the slackness on the part of the credit management staff in their follow up to detect and 
prevent diversion of funds in the post-disbursement stage. 
The controversy as to who should be held responsible for diversion of funds - banks 
or borrowers - may not get settled and is not that material for recovery of NPAs. From 
the RBI side, I would like to stress that borrowers should, in the interest of the viability of 
the banking system on which ifiey are dependent, resist all temptations to divert bank 
funds for uses other than fpr^hich they are sanctioned. Banks too on their part should be 
vigilant to detect and prevent diversion of funds, as any failure in this front is a potential 
source of NPAs. 
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CHAPTER 6 MEASURES TO REDUCE NPAs 
5.1 Measures initiated by Reserve Bank and Government of India for 
reduction of NPAs 
An analysis of NPAs in the Indian banking system as on March 31, 2001 done internally 
in RBI had been put up to the Board for Financial Supervision (BFS) in its 79* meeting 
held on December 27, 2001. In this connection, the BFS directed to conduct a study on 
slippage of NPA accounts from sub-^ standard to doubtful category and to arrive at 
recommendations to prevent such slippage. 
As directed by the BFS, a study was conducted by an in-house group in the Bank by 
scanning relevant information/data obtaitted from a select group of banks as also by 
holding discussions with bank officials/who manage NPAs at the policy level as well as 
those who look after actual recovery, rehabilitation/revival, restructuring of accounts at 
the implementing level. The group, on the basis of the study, had suggested a framework 
of recommendations for preventing slippage of NPAs relevant at the banks' level. The 
draft of these recommendations was circulated amongst the banks for their comments and 
feedback. While most of the banks concurred with the recommendations, some additional 
suggestions received from a number of respondents were analysed, and have been 
factored into the final recommendations. 
Compromise settlement schemes 
The RBI / Government oflndia have been constantly goading the banks to take steps for 
arresting the incidence/of fresh NPAs and have also been creating legal and regulatory 
environment to facUitate the recovery of existing NPAs of banks. More significant of 
them, I would like to recapitulate at this stage. 
The broad framework for compromise or negotiated settlement of NPAs advised by RBI 
in July 1995 continues to be in place. Banks are free to design and implement their own 
policies for recovery and write-off incorporating compromise and negotiated 
settlements with the approval of their Boards, particularly for old and unresolved cases 
falling under the NPA category. The policy framework suggested by RBI provides for 
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setting up of an independent Settlement Advisory Committees headed by a retired Judge 
of the H i ^ Court to scrutinise and recommend compromise proposals 
Specific guidelines were issued in May 1999 to public sector banks for one time non 
discretionary and non discriminatory settlement of NPAs of small sector. The scheme 
was operative upto September 30, 2000. [Public sector banks recovered Rs. 668 crore 
through compromise settlement under this scheme.]. 
Guidelines were modified in July 2000 for recovery of the stock of NPAs of Rs. 5 crore 
and less as on 31 March 1997. [The above guidelines which were valid upto June 30, 
2001 helped the public sector banks to recover Rs. 2600 crore by September 2001] 
An OTS Scheme covering advances of Rs.25000 and below continues to be in operation 
and guidelines in pursuance to the budget announcement of the Hon'ble Finance Minister 
providing for OTS for advances up to Rs.50,000 in respect of NPAs of small/marginal 
farmers are being drawn up. 
Measures for faster legal process 
Lok Adalats 
Lok Adalat institutions help banks to setfie disputes involving accounts in "doubtful" 
and "loss" category, with outstanding /balance of Rs.5 lakh for compromise settlement 
under Lok Adalats. Debt Recovery Tribunals have now been empowered to organize 
Lok Adalats to decide on cases of NPAs of Rs.lO lakhs and above. The public sector 
banks had recovered Rs.40.38 crore as on September 30, 2001, through the forum of Lok 
Adalat. The progress through this channel is expected to pick up in the coming years 
particularly looking at the recent initiatives taken by some of the public sector banks and 
DRTs in Mumbai. / 
Debt Recovery Tribunals 
The Recovery of Deb^ due to Banks and Financial Institutions (amendment) Act, passed 
in March 2000 has helped in strengthening the functioning of DRTs. Provisions for 
placement of more than one Recovery Officer, power to attach defendant's 
property/assets before judgement, penal provisions for disobedience of Tribunal's order 
or for breach of any terms of the order and appointment of receiver with powers of 
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realization, management, protection and preservation of property are expected to provide 
necessary teeth to the DRTs and speed up the recovery of NPAs in the times to come. 
Looking at the huge task on hand with as many as 33049 cases involving Rs.42988.84 
crore pending before them as on September 30,2001, I would like the banks to institute 
appropriate documentation system and render all possible assistance to the DRTs for 
speeding up decisions and recovery of some of the well collateralised NPAs involving 
large amounts. I may add that familiarisation programmes have been offered in NIBM at 
periodical intervals to the presiding officers of DRTs in understanding the complexities 
of documentation and operational features and other legalities applicable of Indian 
banking system. RBI on its part has suggested to the Government to consider enactment 
of appropriate penal provisions against obstruction by borrowers in possession of 
attached properties by DRT receivers, and notify borrowers who default to honour the 
decrees passed against them. 
Circulation of information on defaulters 
The RBI has put in place a system for periodical circulation of details of 
wilful defaults of borrowers of banks and fmancial institutions. This serves as a caution 
list while considering requests for new or additional credit limits from defaulting 
borrowing units and also from the directors /proprietors / partners of these entities. RBI 
also publishes a list of borrowers (with outstandings aggregating Rs. 1 crore and above) 
against whom suits have been filed by banks and FIs for recovery of their funds, as on 
31"' March every year. It is our experience that these measures had not contributed to any 
perceptible recoveries from the defaulting entities. However, they serve as negative 
basket of steps shutting off fresh loans to these defaulters. I strongly believe that a real 
breakthrough can come only if there is a change in the repayment psyche of the Indian 
borrowers. 
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Recovery action against large NPAs 
After a review of pendency in regard to NPAs by tlie Hon'ble Finance Minister, RBI had 
advised the public sector banks to examine all cases of wilftil default of Rs 1 crore and 
above and file suits in such cases, and file criminal cases in regard to wilftil defaults. 
Board of Directors are required to review NPA accounts of Rs. 1 crore and above with 
special reference to fixing of staff accountability. 
On their part RBI and the Government are contemplating several supporting measures 
including legal reforms, some of them I would like to highlight. 
Asset Reconstruction Company: 
An Asset Reconstruction Company with an authorised capital of Rs.2000 crore and 
initial paid up capital Rs.1400 crore is to be set up as/a trust for undertaking activities 
relating to asset reconstruction. It would negotiateyWith banks and financial institutions 
for acquiring distressed assets and develop markets for such assets.. Government of India 
proposes to go in for legal reforms to facilitate ^ e functioning of ARC mechanism 
Corporate Debt Restructuring (CDR) / 
Corporate Debt Restructuring mechanism has been institutionalised in 2001 to provide a 
timely and transparent system for restructuring of the corporate debts of Rs.20 crore and 
above with the banks and financial institutions. The CDR process would also enable 
viable corporate entities to restructure their dues outside the existing legal framework and 
reduce the incidence of fi^sh NPAs. The CDR structure has been headquartered in IDBI, 
Mumbai and a Standing Forum and Core Group for administering the mechanism had 
already been put in place. The experiment however has not taken off at the desired pace 
though more than six months have lapsed since introduction. As announced by the 
Hon'ble Finance Minister in the Union Budget 2002-03, RBI has set up a high level 
Group under the Chairmanship of SHri. Vepa Kamesam, Deputy Governor, RBI to review 
the implementation procedures tof CDR mechanism and to make it more effective. The 
Group will review the operation'of the CDR Scheme, identify the operational difficulties, 
if any, in the smooth implementation of the scheme and suggest measures to make the 
operation of the scheme more efficient. 
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Credit Information Bureau 
Institutionalisation of information sharing arrangements tlirough the newly formed Credit 
Information Bureau of India Ltd. (CIBIL) is under way. RBI is considering 
the recommendations of the S.R. Iyer Group (Chairman of CIBIL) to operationalise the 
scheme of information dissemination on defaults to the financial system. The main 
recommendations of the Group include dissemination of information relating to suit-filed 
accounts regardless of the amount claimed in the suit or amount of credit granted by a 
credit institution as also such irregular accounts where the borrower has given consent 
for disclosure. This, I hope, would prevent those who take advantage of lack of system of 
information sharing amongst lending institutions to borrow large amounts against same 
assets and property, which had in no small measure contributed to the incremental NPAs 
of banks. 
Proposed guidelines on wilful defaults/diversion of funds 
RBI is examining the recommendation of Kohli Group on wilful defaulters. It is working 
out a proper definition covering such classes of defaulters so that credit denials to this 
group of borrowers can be made effective and criminal prosecution can/be made 
demonstrative against wilful defaulters. 
Corporate Governance 
A Consultative Group under the chairmanship of Dr.A.Ganguly wg^ set up by the 
Reserve Bank to review the supervisory role of Boards of banks and financial institutions 
and to obtain feedback on the functioning of the Boards vis-a-vis compliance, 
transparency, disclosures, audit committees etc. and make recommendations for making 
the role of Board of Directors more effective with a view to minimising risks and over-
exposure. The Group is finalising its recommendations shortly and may come out with 
guidelines for effective control and supervision by bank boards over credit management 
and NPA prevention measures. 
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5.2 A critical evaluation of the Policy measures to control 
A discussion of NPAs reveals that two sets of factors are in actionrOne that leads to the 
emergence of NPA and the other helps in its perpetuation and does not allow the problem 
to be resolvedOne set of policies aims at preventing an asset from degenerating into NPA 
and the other set is to ensure recovery in case of default. While PSBs have their share of 
fault in failing to check the growth of NPAs, the more significant problem appears to be 
related with the asset market. It is in this context, the policy measures introduced need to 
be critically looked into. 
In the first set of policies, the measures intended to granting a measure of autonomy 
subject to prudential guidelines are discussed below. These measures may be classified 
into two categories. One was deregulation of interest rate, while the other one related to 
dismantling of statutory credit allocation mechanisms. 
The period prior to 1992 was characterised by administered interest rate as well as tight 
credit allocation mechanisms. In April 1992, steps were taken by RBI to deregulate 
interest rate on liabilities and assets in a phased manner. Interest rate deregulation started 
with deposit rate. Banks were allowed to fix deposit rates below a ceiling rate announced 
by RBI. Deregulation of lending rates began in October 1994 with deregulation of rates 
for advances greater than Rs 200,000 subject to a certain norm. The single most 
important event in this phase was deregulation of entry of private domestic banks through 
the issue of specific guidelines by RBI on 22 January 1993 as per the recommendations 
of Narasimham Committee. The interest rate on liabilities was fiirther deregulated 
subsequently. Since July 1996, RBI had been taking steps to abolish ceiling on interest 
rates for deposits of different maturities, beginning with those with the maximum 
maturity. By April 1998 interest rate on deposits for more than fifteen days had also been 
freed. Banks were allowed to charge differential rates on 
deposits of similar maturity but of differeptsizes. However, interest rates on 
saving deposits continue to be governed by RBI. Interest rates on NRI domestic term 
deposits under Non-Resident (External) Rupee Accounts scheme have also been 
deregulated, and banks have been given the freedom to fix their own interest rates on 
deposit under Foreign Currency Non-Resident Accounts (Banks) scheme subject to a 
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ceiling prescribed by the RBI from time to time. Alongside this, banks were exempted 
from obtaining prior approval of the RBI or prior concurrence of the IBA for introducing 
new deposits mobilization schemes, except for NRI deposits. However it remains 
obligatory for banks to obtain prior approval of their respective boards and follow the 
directives on interest rates, premature withdrawal, sanction of loans and advances against 
deposits etc issued by RBI from time to time. During this phase, deregulation of interest 
rate on assets was continued. After deregulating the lending rate for loans above Rs 
2,00,000, lending rates for loans below Rs 200,000 have also been partially deregulated 
with effect from April 1998. Interest on all loans below Rs 2, 00,000 was allowed to vary 
up to an upper limit set by PLR. These rates were earlier fixed at 12 percent for credit up 
to Rs 25,000 and 13.5 percent for credits limits between Rs 25000 and Rs 2,00,000. 
Deregulation in lending rates has been followed by lifting of different quantitative 
restrictions on credit allocation. All instructions relating to maximum permissible bank 
finance, and credit monitoring arrangements have been withdrawn since April 1997. 
Similar deregulations have also been made with respect to term finance by virtue of 
which RBI has withdrawn its stipulation both on time and quantum of loans that can be 
granted by banks either individually or in consortia for a single project. Deregulation of 
interest rate has provided an opportunity for banks to fix interest rates for different 
categories of borrowers in accordance with their risk profile. Discarding of credit 
allocation schemes has led to more autonomy on the part of the banks in formulating their 
own method of assessing working capital needs of borrowers within the prudential 
guidelines and exposure norms prescribed by RBI. 
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5.3 Problems with these policies 
Monetary developments in the first half of 1998-99, as outlined in the mid-term review of 
the credit policy, has made it clear that there is adequate liquidity in the system and had 
advised the banks to step up their lending operations. However, this has not happened. 
Due to very stringent RBI norms on NPAs, there appears to be a universal thought 
process in all echelons of the banking system that it is better not to lend rather than to 
face the risk of NPAs. Banks are more comfortable with lending to companies with AAA 
or AA ratings since they do not run the risk of NPAs. This resulted in what has been 
termed as "islandisation of credit" 
. It is a phenomenon where the credit delivery Is polarised and handful of large 
companies with very good ratings gobble up most of the credit leaving the rest of the 
industrial sector high and dry. It has been observed that Corporation Bank roped in 
certain zero risk clients in 1999 for extending 500 crores at PLR 
. However, it is argued that such a phenomenon is also fi-aught with problems. Denying 
credit to companies without top ratings has an adverse effect on the industrial production 
and GDP growth. This will not only stifle the companies that are deprived of credit but 
also harm the companies with top ratings by aggravating recession. The new banking 
culture, nurtured by economic and financial reforms has induced PSBs to focus on 
consumer credit and capital-market related activities, apart from corporate elite. Lending 
to agriculture, small-scale industries and the self-employment sector has become infra-
dig. This illusion was shattered with the capital market becoming moribund during 
2003.While, in the case of consumer lending, a sort of saturation point was reached, and 
the PSBs found the soft option of investing a bulk of their resources in government 
securities. This trend which has become a chronic feature of PSBs, has been characterised 
as a sort of sickness of the PSBs. It is against this backdrop, the activist role that RBI has 
at long last resumed playing in prodding PSBs to lend more to the rural and semi-urban 
areas has to be viewed. Credit policy measures announced on April 29,2003 also carries a 
firm tone that PSBs be dissuaded them from exercising the soft option of investing bulk 
of their resources in government securities. A drastic step like imposing a ceiling on 
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PSBs investments, say 30 percent of their NTDL has already been^uggested to provoke 
these PSBs to reach out to the intended sectors. 
To overcome the second type of problems, the steps taken by the government are to 
strengthen institutional framework so as to ensure speedy/^very consequent on default. 
After default, the only course of action left to banks isao take possession of the collateral 
and sell in the market at an a price covering the loan amount, interest amount and the 
incidental expenses. But, for utilizing of the assbt market in solving problem of NPA 
may require the following three conditions. 
1. The bank can smoothly take the possession of the asset. 
2. A secondary market in the ceased asset must exist. 
3. Transaction cost of operating in the market is low so that it may be used for 
realising a commensurate price of the collateral. / 
Selvam Committee framed by IBA on NPAs/argued that it takes decades for courts to 
decide cases and even when degrees are obtained, execution of decrees are virtually an 
impossible task. In view of the inability of the legal system to help tackle the problem of 
NPAs, government set up the Debt Recovery Tribunals (DRTs henceforth) during 1994 
in terms of "Recovery of Debts Due to banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993." 
DRTs have been conferred jurisdiction to try and entertain application for recovery of 
debts due to banks and financial institutions. The jurisdiction of the civil courts has been 
excluded in matters falling within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal except under Articles 
226 and 227 of the Constitution of India. The Debt Recovery Tribunal, which has the 
jurisdiction to entertain only claims from banks and financial institutions, will not have 
the jurisdiction to entertain a cros^ suit or counter-claim that may be founded either on 
the same or a separate cause of attion and/or the Amount of which may even be in excess 
of the claim in suit. This is because the Debt/Recovery Tribunal has no jurisdiction to 
pass and decree or order for i^covery against/he bank or financial institutions. 
An Appellate Tribunal ha/also been constituted to entertain appeals from orders of the 
Debt Recovery Tribunal, ijf a person is aggrieved by the order of the DRT, it can file an 
appeal to the Appellate Tribunal within 30 days from date of receipt of the DRT order. If 
the DRT or Appellate Tribunal holds that possession of assets by the secured creditor was 
61 
CHAPTER 6 MEASURES TO REDUCE NPAs 
wrongful and directs the secured creditor to return asset to concerned borrower, the 
borrower shall be entitled to compensation and costs as may be determined by DRT or 
Appellate tribunal. The Tribunal can also direct return of assets, if the secured creditor 
had already sold or transferred the asset to a third party. 
However, DRTs, conceived as fast techniques for recovery of bank loans remained 
virtual non-starters. The reasons include inadequate infrastructure unable to handle large 
number of cases under DRTs, inappropriate legal framework governing the functioning 
of DRTs and ineffective threat of forcing recovery through DRT, when loans are not 
backed by assets. 
A new ordinance called "Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Asset and 
Enforcement of Security Interest Act" was issued on June 21, 2003. It allowed secured 
lenders to sell and lease assets which are charged with them by a defaulting borrower 
without the lender's consent, after issuing a notice the assets are immediately classified as 
non performing, without a protracted legal battle. The ordinance deals with three basic 
issues: securitisation of assets, setting up of an asset construction company and 
enforcement of securities. What is being focused here is enforcement of security, which 
boils down to taking control of a defaulter's assets. 
However it has been observed that, DRTs frequently raise objections when lenders 
approach them with the plea to initiate action under Securitisation Act in suit filed 
accounts that have been lying before the tribunals. This is an example 
how two measures designed to solve the same problem run at cross purposes. The 
passage of the above mentioned act did not mean end of court interventions in settlement 
of NPA problem. The legality of the Act has been challenged by several lenders against 
whom banks had threatened action of seizure and sell-off assets under the powers derived 
from the legislation. The Supreme court had issued a stay on sale of assets under the act 
after Mardia Chemicals had filed a case against ICICI Bank for paying up its dues, failing 
which the bank had threatened recovery action under the act. Subsequently, several 
companies that had incurred the wrath of its lenders filed cases in the high courts 
challenging the notices issued to them and have obtained stay of further action. 
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Pending litigation blocks attachment and selling of collateral by the bank in case of 
default. In the meantime, the value of assets erodes faster with lengthy time taken for sale 
only realising junk value. After the first round of notices to big defaulters with loans up 
to RslO crores as per Securitisation Act, some banks, still reluctant to seize assets have 
sent a second round of notices to defaulters to come forward for compromise for 
settlement. Banks do not want to attach the assets of the defaulter as it has inadequate 
expertise in managing or disposing of those attached assets to recover its due from its 
defaulters. Instead it prefers to bring the provisions of Securitisation Act to bring its 
defaulters to the negotiation table and execute compromise deals towards early recovery 
of NPAs. The biggest failure of PSBs in recovering their NPA is on account of big 
borrowers with PSBs making recoveries of merely Rs 168 crores against NPAs under this 
category of Rs 22,355 crores till March 2003. This poor response of the scheme forced 
RBI to extend the scheme till December 31, 2003 against the earlier deadline of October 
31, 2003. High value defaults with dues exceeding Rs 5 crores accounted for total NPAs 
of PSBs to the extent of Rs 22,866 crores, accounted for a large portion of their total Rs 
56,000 crores NPAs. Quite clearly, the response of this section of defaulters is the most 
critical part of any attempt to significantly bring down the NPA burden of PSBs. It is felt 
that reluctance of the 
large defaulters to come forward for settlement discussions indicates that they are 
probably more confident to take on the lenders if action is threatened under the 
Securitisation Act presumably because of political clout). Thus, political interference 
appears to be significant as it acts as a double-edged sword, both in creating as well as 
perpetuation of NPA problem. 
Narasimham Committee suggested formation of an "Asset Reconstruction Fund" which 
will take over bad and doubtful debts fi-om banks at a discount and subsequently follow 
up the recovery of dues owed to them by the primary borrowers. Having acquired bad 
loans, ARFs have four options to recover. They include sale of collateral, restructuring 
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the loan, foreclosure of the loan and seizure of all the assets and going for liquidation of 
the company. A complexity of factors conspires against formation and consequent 
satisfactory operation of ARFs. They are discussed below. 
a) Lack of a market in impaired financial asset 
The first step towards formation of ARF is to transfer impaired financial assets from 
banks to the new entity. However, it has been observed that talks between banks and RBI 
on guidelines for ARFs appears to be stuck on the pricing of the impaired assets in the 
absence of a market, where such prices may be determined. ARF managers prefer to price 
the impaired assets net of provisioning with a view to reduce financial outgoes to the 
banks. Banks have not agreed to this and have expressed preference for auditors and 
chartered accountants to value the market price of an NPA put up on sale to the ARF. 
This problem is aggravated due to lack of existence of a secondary market of physical 
assets. This leads us the next problem. 
b) Lack of a secondary market in physical asset 
It appears ARCs can not be a success story in absence of secondary market in ceased 
asset. The problem originates due to the fact that these assets are idiosyncratic, i.e. 
invested for a specific purpose. Its value is realised only if it is functioning for that 
particular purpose. It has no value (except scrap value) for other purposes. The set of its 
potential buyers is highly restricted to those who can utilise this asset in a productive 
way, provided the asset will remain technologically viable. 
c) Claims of banks preceded by that of financial institutions 
There is again a legal aspect of the current standoff with regard to ARFs. As per the law, 
financial institutions providing long term funds have first charge on assets, with banks 
holding second or third charge. On current asset, the bank hold the first charge, but in the 
case of an NPA current asset are usually nil. In such a case, financial institutions get 
away with the sale proceeds of the NPA, leaving the banks in the lurch. While some 
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bankers have argued for a pro-rata sharing of sale proceeds irrespective of the nature of 
the charge, RBI can not change the basic law. 
The above discussion reveals that a number of conditions are necessary for operating in a 
secondary market for assets with a low transaction cost. They include speedy trial at 
lower litigation cost, getting possession of the asset, once the verdict is given in favour of 
the bank, lower intermediation cost. 
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Conclusions 
It was commonly believed that the Indian government could not afford bank failure, the 
government would rescue the banks whatever was the level of the crisis. This caused 
some sort of desperation on the part of both the bankers and borrowers. The state, and 
RBI in particular, made concerted efforts to control it. When the new accounting practice 
was introduced, where interest earnings included the realised interest only, not the 
interest accrual, PSBs showed substantial losses and thereby a massive recapitalisation 
was called for. On the other hand, in order to clean off the NPAs from the balance sheet, 
banks had to make provisioning against these loss assets. This in turn affected their profit 
to a great extent putting these banks in a kind of vicious cycle. 
Over the next ten years these ratios slowly declined - by 2003, gross NPAs to total 
advances became 9.4 percent and that in total assets became 4.2 percent. This decline was 
not due to recovery of the loss assets but due to faster growth of advances and assets of 
the banks compared to their NPAs. However, incrementaH^fPAs in fresh advances or 
assets declined considerably. This may be interpreted in/(erms of concerted efforts made 
by the RBI in raising competitiveness and efficiency^and in terms of granting greater 
autonomy to the banks in their decision-making. 
However, in absolute terms, gross NPAs rapidly increased - within the ten year period, 
1993-2003, it rose from Rs 39 thousand croses to Rs 54 thousand crores. While analysing 
the factors responsible for the massive accumulation of NPAs alternative approaches and 
frameworks have been used in this paper. First, formation of NPAs is seen as an integral 
part of banking activities and its magnitude would depend on the exposure of the banks to 
various levels of risks across sectors of economic activities. But, it was noted that the 
risks (measured by returns in terms of interest earnings) are not commensurate with the 
NPAs. The explanations of liberalisation and globalisation, overall economic slowdown, 
stagnation in many industries and agriculture j^ading to NPA formation, could not stand 
in explaining such a high share of default in total advances. Nevertheless, the above 
mentioned problems might have contributed towards NPA formation to an extent. 
A micro-level probe would reveal that non-economic factors, like moral hazards, adverse 
selection, screening and monitoring problems.principal agency problems, are highly 
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important - some of which are operating through political and bureaucratic channels and 
some others through banks' own administrative channels in granting loans and in 
preventing recovery of dues. In case of Indian PSBs this has become a rampant and all-
pervasive phenomenon. In fact high incidence of default in the priority sector lending 
may be attributed to a great extent to the political factors. Similarly, there are ample 
evidence of big borrowers in the non-priority sectors who defaulted but the banks could 
not penalise and confiscate their assets because the latter wielded enormous political 
power and at times influence over the board of members of the banks. The problem of 
confiscation of asset was further aggravated by two important factors - legal factors that 
take a long time to settle any dispute, and highly imperfect or inadequately formed 
markets for confiscated assets. All this leads the banks to go for compromise with the 
defaulters giving several concessions to the latter and this encourages the others to 
default. The evolving policies of settlement of NPAs are being frequently thwarted by 
legal injunctions and are yet to be concretised. 
Thus, NPA formation depends not only on banking rules, regulations and practices that 
are part of its institutions, but also on the external institutional environment within which 
PSBs operate, like the political will, cultural practices or the social customs/moral fabric 
of the society, and overall economic conditions. Several of these internal and external 
institutions have degenerated over the decades, some of which are worth mentioning. 
Table 20: Growth rate of schedule commercial banks' deposits and investments in 
government securities 
Period 
1970-80 
1980-90 
1990-2002 
Growth rate of commercial 
banks' deposits (%) 
20.68 
17.96 
17.07 
Growth rate and investments in 
government securities (%) 
21.16 
19.22 
20.62 
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Till the initiation of reforms in 1992, Indian PSBs, had been operating not as an 
independent organization, but as if a subsidiary to the government with the objective of 
meeting the financial requirements of the state. They operated under the strict guidelines 
of the RBI, which were all encompassing. Although most of their deposit came from the 
private sector, i.e., households, a major part of their lending was confined to the 
government, and they also made substantial investment in government bills/securities as 
shown in the table 6. The developmental policies of the state-requiring mobilisation of a 
large sum of money made the state a major customer of the PSBs. RBI acted as the 
mediator between the state and PSBs more or less determining the amount/share of the 
deposit to be allocated to the state and the private sectors. For the private sector lending it 
fixed ceiling and floor rates of interest depending on the type of loan, size of loan, type of 
borrower, nature of collateral, etc. The interest rates often did not reflect the risks of 
lending. RBI also fixed interest rates on deposits. The bank had little room for making 
own decisions in adjusting interest rates with the risks of lending, especially to the private 
borrowers. 
With fi^quent intervals, RBI changed CRR, SLR, and shares of loans to priority sector 
and other sectors, and the banks gradually learnt to adjust receiving deposits, lending and 
making investments accordingly. Through division of labour in the branches, banks were 
able to routinise things. Under this system, there was very limited scope for making 
profitable innovations in terms of both organisational changes and seeking new sources 
of fund and new avenues of investments/lending. 
As stated above, for many of the private sector loans, banks were not able to match risks 
with interest rate restrictions imposed by the RBI. Once RBI fixed the share of loans and 
the rate of interest to particular sectors, banks became constrained not to discriminate 
among borrowers of a limited number. For a long period, real interest rates were negative 
for many of these loans; obviously, vested interest, political and local intervention would 
creep in in order to extract surplus in the system (i.e., difference between the opportunity 
costs and actual cost of borrowing). Since it was not mandatory on the part of the banks 
to declare NPA or recover loans, and since, RBI was happy so long as the banks were 
able to finance state expenditure, a laxity crept into the banking sector. This happened 
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particularly for the kind of private sector lending mentioned above and, in general, profit 
earning/ meeting the interests of the depositors became the secondary objective of the 
banks. Often the non-intended borrowers received the loans, and even for the case of 
some target borrowers, the influential brokers who arranged the loans would take away a 
sizeable amount of the loan disbursed. The borrowers would not be able to repay the 
loans; even if they could, they would not be interested in doing so. The broker had to 
manipulate the system in such a way that the bank could not penalise the borrowers. On 
the contrary, the bank granted fresh loans to the defaulters so that the debt would roll 
on(known as evergreening of accounts). Under these circumstances, it was quite obvious 
that some personnel of the bank would also try to extract some surplus. 
Thus a new institution which is degenerative of the bank evolved. The institution 
involved a nexus of some personnel of banks, brokers, and borrowers, that would siphon 
off public money through manipulating banking machinery, state machinery, mobilising 
political and local forces. The banks on the other hand showed this lost money, or the 
rolling loans, as normal assets, as if earning interests or compounding over the years. The 
banking institution and their institutional environment that evolved over the decades were 
therefore not supportive of healthy and innovative ways of making progress by the banks. 
This is reflected in the functioning of the banks during the post reform period 
when several attempts have been made to improve upon the situation. Changes in the 
instruments with the banks, on the one hand, through reducing CRR, SLR, (marginally 
raising capital adequacy ratio), raised banks' loanable money from a given deposit, and 
on the other hand, considerably widening banks' freedom in their own decision making 
raised efficiency. Of late, state enactment provided greater power to the banks to penalise 
defaulters. 
It was expected that all this would make the PSBs more profitable, efficient and 
innovative with much reduced NPA. It needs to be mentioned that the institutions are 
slow to change, routines are difficult to break or change. Previously, almost the entire 
part of the decisions was de facto guided by the state/ RBI, and the return on the 
compulsory lending to the state was also certain. Under the changed situation, in spite of 
the autonomy in decision making, PSBs could not come out of this routine behaviour of 
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operating in a risk free environment. They invested the extra money released from 
reduced SLR, CRR, on government bills and securities with assured return. Their lack of 
innovativeness is also indicated by the late introduction of credit/debit cards, ATM 
facilities which private banks started much early. Possibly PSBs did it under compulsion, 
as the ultimate strength of a bank is its depositors who tended to move away from the 
PSBs. 
As regards continued loan defaults and NPA, the bank routines/ rigidities, and the 
institutions involving nexus of borrowers, agents and bank personnel continued to be 
responsible even under liberalisation, RBI's insistence on reduction of NPA and more 
restrictive legal enactment. It is not yet mentioned that the innovations may be a routine 
affair and can be institutionalised. But this is not the case with the Indian PSBs. Rather it 
could be a case with institutions, involving the nexus of vested interests indicated above, 
making frequent innovations in diverting bank money for personal gain as revealed in the 
past when special types of fraud cases were made public. The latter institutions are very 
difficult to change - it not only requires stringent punitive enactment and vigilance, but 
also public awareness, campaign and reforming electoral colleagues. Political forces to 
induce default must be contained. Given the institutional features of the PSBs and their 
institutional environment, no radical improvement is expected from these banks within a 
short period whatever be the improvement in the legal structure, organizational change 
and the level of autonomy. These are nevertheless essential for long term improvement 
and for building healthy institutions albeit slowly. 
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CHAPTER 8 SUGGESTIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Suggestions and Recommendations 
The preventive and corrective measures suggested under the framework of 
recommendations are an indicative but not exhaustive set of guidelines relevant at banks' 
level. Appropriate action in respect of individual accounts may be taken keeping in view 
the peculiarities of the situation involved. Also, it was observed from the feedback 
received that a number of banks are already following some of th^uggested measures in 
one form or the other in their NPA management. The objective underlying the exercise is 
to evolve a common minimum framework to tackle thi/problem, whilst leaving the 
individual banks/FIs free to formulate their own internal policies. Nevertheless, it is 
expected that concerned institutions will work out their strategic response in keeping with 
the broad thrust of these guidelines. 
(i) Early Recognition of the problem: 
Recognize the problem early: Invariably, by the time banks start their efforts to get 
involved in a revival process, it's too late to retrieve the situation - both in terms of 
rehabilitation of the project and recovery of bank's dues. Identification of weakness in the 
very beginning (i.e., when the account starts showing first signs of weakness regardless 
of the fact that it may not have become NPA) is imperative. Assessment of the potential 
of revival may be done on the basis of a techno-economic viability study. Restructuring 
should be attempted where, after an obipetive assessment of the viability and promoter's 
intention (and his stake), banks are convinced of a turnaround within a scheduled 
/ / 
timeframe. In respect of totally unviable units as decided by the bank/consortium, it is 
better to facilitate winding up/selling of the unit early, so as to recover whatever is 
possible through legal means before the security positiop^ecomes worse. 
Recourse to the new ordinance: The Government ofTndia has promulgated an ordinance 
on June 21, 2002, called "The Securitisation and Reconstruction of financial Assets and 
Enforcement of Security Interest Ordinance, 2 0 ^ " to facilitate foreclosure of financial 
assets. In respect of totally unviable units as decided by the bank/consortium, action 
under this ordinance may be initiated without any loss of time. Banks are also strongly 
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encouraged to take immediate recourse to this legal remedy where they encounter 
malfeasance on the part of promoters/borrowers. 
Early Alert System: The strategy for management of NPAs may be governed by the 
circumstances connected to each individual case. Generally, the NPA is more likely to be 
resolved in terms of recovery if the company is in operation. For this to be effective there 
must be a system of identifying the weakness in accounts at an early stage. Banks may 
put in place an "Early Alert" system that captures early warning signals in respect of 
accounts showing first signs of weakness. This system may be an integral part of the risk 
management process of the bank. Internationally, there is a similar system of "Special 
Mention Accounts". Depending upon the identified weaknesses, one may go back (rather 
than with reference to current period) to a prior or earlier period in determining the 
rehabilitation response. 
Under the "Early Alert" system, for intemal monitoring purpose, banks may designate a 
time limit for overdue accounts to determine the threshold for a proactive intervention -
well before the account becomes NPA. This is to enable a bank to assess whether the 
default is due to some inherent weakness or due to a temporary liquidity or cash flow 
problem, and accordingly calibrate its response. For example, where there is a default in 
an account for 30 days, it may be shifted to a special category. Out of the accounts, ones 
that show promise may be considered for granting incremental facility for specific 
purposes, such as for capital expenditure, by ensuring strictest possible end use of the 
money. All the accounts displaying unsatisfactory features/early warning signals should 
be put under potential NPA list for follow up and time bound action to prevent their 
slippage. The account may be classified as potential NPA on account of one or more of 
the following illustrative list of features even though the account may be regular: 
Delay in submission of stock statement / Other control statements / financial statements. 
Return of cheques issued by borrowers. Devolvement of DPG instalments and non-
payment within a reasonable period Frequent devolvement of LC and non-payment 
within a reasonable period. Frequent invocation of BGs and non-repayment within a 
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reasonable period. Return of bills / cheques discounted. Non-payment of bills discounted 
or under collection. Poor financial performance in terms of declining sales and profits, 
cash losses, net losses, erosion of net worth etc. Incomplete documentation in terms of 
creation / registration of charge / mortgage etc. Non-compliance of terms and conditions 
of sanction. 
(ii) Identifying borrowers with genuine intent: 
Identifying borrowers with genuine intent from those who are non- serious with no 
commitment or stake in revival is a challenge confronting bankers. Here the role of 
frontline officials at the branch level is paramount as they are the ones who have 
intelligence inputs with regard to promoters' sincerity, wherewithal, and capability to 
achieve a turnaround. Based on this objective assessment, banks should decide as quickly 
as possible whether it would be worthwhile t^ commit additional finance. 
In this regard, banks may consider having 'Special Investigative Audit' of all financial 
transactions/business transactions, books of accounts in order to ascertain real factors that 
contributed to sickness of the borrower. Banks may have a panel of technical experts with 
proven expertise and track record for preparation of techno - economic viability study of 
the projects of the borrowers. 
Borrowers having genuine problems due to temporary mismatch in funds flow or sudden 
requirements of additional funds may be entertained at the branch level, and for this 
purpose a special limit to tide over such coritingencies may be built into the sanction 
process itself This will obviate the need to/oute the additional funding request through 
the controlling offices in deserving cases/and help avert many accounts slipping into 
NPA category. 
(iii) Timeliness and adequacy of response: / 
Longer the delay in response (in fact, R e t i m e s branch officials may have to act suo-
moto), greater the injury to the account and the asset. Time is a crucial element in any 
restructuring/rehabilitation strategy. Further, the response decided on the basis of techno-
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economic study and promoter's commitment, has to be adequate in terms of extent of 
additional funding, relaxations etc. under the restructuring exercise. The package of 
assistance may be flexible, and where required, the bank may also look at the exit option, 
(iv) Focus on Cash Flows: 
While financing, at the time of restructuring, banks may not be guided by the 
conventional Funds Flow Analysis only, which could yield a potentially misleading 
picture. Appraisal for fresh credit requirements may be done by analysing Funds Flow in 
conjunction with Cash Flows rather than only on the basis of Funds Flow. 
(iv) Management efTectiveness: 
The general perception among borrowers is that it is lack of finance that leads to sickness 
and NPAs. But this may not be the case all the time. Management effectiveness in 
tackling adverse business conditions is a very important aspect that affects a borrowing 
unit's fortunes. Additional finance to an ailing unit may be committed by a bank only 
after basic viability of the enterprise also in the context of quality of management is 
examined and confirmed. Where the default is due to deeper malady, viability study or 
Investigative audit should be done - it will be useful to have a consultant appointed as 
early as possible to examine this aspect. A proper techno-economic viability study must 
thus become the basis on which any future action can be considered. 
(v) Consortium/multiple financing: 
During the exercise for assessment of viability and restructuring, a pragmatic and unified 
approach by all the lending banks/FIs as also sharing of all relevant information on the 
borrower would go a long way toward overall success of rehabilitation effort. However, 
there is an element of risk in any restructuring exercise, given the probability of 
success/failure. One may expect a success rate of 50% in restructuring efforts, for it is 
unrealistic to expect 100% success rate. 
In some default cases, where the unit is still working, the bank should make sure that it 
captures the cash flows (there is a tendency on part of the borrowers to switch bankers 
once they default, for fear of getting their cash flows forfeited), and ensure that such cash 
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flows are used for working capital purposes. Toward this end, there should be regular 
flow of information among consortium members. A bank, which is not part of the 
consortium may not be allowed to offer credit facilities to such defaulting clients. Current 
account facilities may also be denied at non-consortium banks to such clients and 
violation may attract penal action. The Credit Information Bur^U of India Ltd. (CIBIL) 
may be very useful for meaningful information e x c h a n ^ ^ defaulting borrowers once 
the setup becomes fully operational, In a forum of leni^rs, the priority of each lender will 
be different. While one set of lenders may be williilg to wait for a longer time to recover 
its dues, another lender may have a much shorter timeframe in mind. So it is possible that 
the latter category of lenders may be willing to exit, even at a cost - i.e., by a discounted 
settlement of the exposure. Therefore, any plan for restructuring/rehabilitation may take 
this aspect into account. 
Corporate Debt Restructuring mechanism has been instjt6tionalised in 2001 to provide a 
timely and transparent system for restructuring of th^orporate debts of Rs.20 crore and 
above with banks and FIs on a voluntary basis ajra outside the legal framework. Under 
this system, banks may greatly benefit in terms of restructuring of large standard accounts 
(Potential NPAs) and viable sub-standard accounts with consortium/multiple banking 
arrangements. 
(vi) Legal and related issues: 
Change in mindset regarding legal action: Legal action may be initiated once the 
Banks/FIs are convinced and have reached the conclusion that rehabilitation is not 
possible and there is no other way out. This will put pressure on the borrowers and will 
reduce the chances of depletion in the value of the security. In this context, the new 
securities ordinance, as mentioned earlier, will go a long way in developing the culture of 
prompt repayment of banks' / FIs' dues. Under this ordinance, substantial powers have 
been granted to the Banks / FIs for enforc^ent of securities without the intervention of 
the courts / tribunals. Similarly powers liave been given to Banks / FIs to take over the 
management of business of the defaultuig borrowers. With these special powers a strong 
message is being sent to the borrowers of Banks /FIs across the country. Banks would do 
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well to capitalise on this message in dealing ^ h recalcitrant borrowers and wilful 
defaulters. 
Banks may take recourse to criminal proceedings along with civil suit where misleading 
information has been furnished influencing the bank's credit decision. Also in case of 
value-less guarantees and diversion yof funds, bank may not hesitate to initiate criminal 
proceedings. Also borrowers may be asked to declare on oath their borrowings, assets, 
and all other material facts, which can be the basis for criminal action in future, if details 
are not found to be correct. 
When considering a plan for the/revival/rehabilitation, the lenders should retain the right 
to exercise control over the/ownership/ management. This can be done by ensuring 
pledge of promoter's shanwiolding to the lenders with a right to change ownership if 
certain covenants/stipulations are not met. 
(vii) Auditor's Responsibility: 
In case any falsification of accounts on the part of the borrowers is observed by the 
banks/FIs, they should lodge a formal complaint against the auditors of the borrowers 
with the Institute of Chartered Accountants of India (ICAI) if it is observed that the 
auditors were negligent or deficient in conducting the audit to enable the ICAI to examine 
and fix accountability of me auditors. 
With a view to monitoring end-use of funds, if the lenders desire a specific certification 
from the borrowers' auditors regarding diversion/ siphoning of funds by the borrower, the 
lender should award a separate mandate to the auditors for the purpose. To facilitate such 
certification by the auditors, the banks and FIs will also need to ensure that appropriate 
covenants in the loan agreements are incorporated to enable award of such a mandate by 
the lenders to the borrowers/auditors. 
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(viii) Government relief: 
State Government relief (state tax waiver, subsidy etc.) in respect of accounts enjoying 
the same takes long time to come, thus worseniog the overdue position. There is a need to 
work in the direction of cutting down/ reducing the time lag by closer monitoring. 
While it may so happen that circumstances warrant a different course of action, the above 
set of guidelines may be adhered to as a broader framework for preventing slippage of 
NPAs. 
(ix) Awareness development 
There is also need to develop orgam^ation-wide awareness about banks key-business 
problems including stagnant business units, strain 
on profitability, cost of operations, unexplored business opportunities, manpower costs, 
NPAS etc. This could be done «y senior and top management at various key centres for 
all the staff to make them awire about the areas of concern for the bank with a view to 
seek their involvement in improving business growth and profitability. It can be said from 
the personal experience of the author that such sharing is always useful and trade unions' 
as well as employees' response to organisational improvement process is generally 
encouraging. 
(x) Industrial relations climate 
Trade unions and bank management have to identify key issues for reform in HR areas 
that could be crucial to meet competition. By and large, bi-partitism is well established in 
each bank and many contentious issues can be resolved by discussions. Tender 
mindedness, compromises ori principles and appeasement must give way to more serious 
dialogue on important issues. Issues such as review of existing settlements, re-
deployment of surplus staff, removal of restrictive practices, re-defining clerical and 
subordinate staff roles, performance appraisal of clerical staff are some of the issues that 
require negotiations with unions to improve productivity, work-culture and finally a 
smooth transition to competitive environment. 
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Finally, there is a need to re-define the HR roles in the ba r i ^y forging HR-business 
partnership. This will require very matured handling and/monitoring of this critical 
function. In the ultimate analysis, one of the key agenda before PSBs should be to 
improve quality of their assets-both fmancial as well as human. 
(xi) Efifectiveness of Assets Reconstruction Companies (ARCs): 
Concerns have been raised about their reievence to india. A significant percentage of the 
NPAs of the PSBs are in the priority sector. Loan in rural areas are dijfficult to colect and 
banks by virtue of their sheer reach are bette placed to repover these loans. Loak Adalat 
and Debt Recovery Tribanals are other effective mechimism to handle this task. ARCs 
should focus on the larger borrowers. Further, ther iy need for private sector and foreign 
participation in ARC. Private parties will lok to aaive resolution of the problem and not 
merely regard it as a book transaction. Movii^ NPAs to ARCs doesn't get rid of the 
problem. In china, poetential investors are sUll worried about the risk of non-enforcement 
of ownership rights of the assets they purchase from the ARCs. Actions and measures 
have to be taken to built investor confidence. 
(xii) Well-Developed Capital Markets: 
Numerous paper have stressed the critically of a well developoped capital market in the 
restructuring process. A capital market brings liquidity and amechanism for fear of 
capital loans. Without this a bank may seek to postpone the NPA problem for fear of 
capital adwquacy problems and resort to tactics like evergreening. Monitiring by 
bondholders is better as they have no motive to sustain uneconomic activity. Further, the 
banks can manage credit risk better as it is easier to sell or securitize loans a dnegotaite 
credit derivetives. Indian debt market is relatively under developed and attention shoul be 
focused on building liquidity and'volumes. 
(xiii) Contextual Decision Making: 
Regulation must incorporate^ a contextual perspective (like temporary cash flow 
problems) and clients should be handled in a manner which feflects true value of their 
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assets and future potential to pay. The top management shoul delegate and back decisions 
of this kinf taken by middle level managers. 
(xiv)Securitization: 
This has been used extensively in china, Japan and Korea andJi^ attracted international 
participants due to lower liquidity risks. The resolution '1)3^ Corporation has helped the 
Securitization market in Asian and has taken over around $460 billion as bad assets from 
over 750 failed banks. Its highly standardized^ product s^peals to a broad base. 
Securitization in India still in a nascent stage but has potential in area like mortgage-
backed securitization. ICRA estimates th '^^ current market size to be around Rs. 3000 
crores. 
(xv) Realignment of Performance Metrics: 
Traditional performance measures like ROE and NPA Ration are not really indicative of 
performance. A high volume of bad debt lending today will impact positively on ROE, 
asset growth and NPA Ration and only show up 5 years later as NPAs. The complexity of 
the balance sheet makes it impossible to desegregate the impact of these actions even if 
stricter disclosure norms are put in place. 
Economic Value of Equity (EVE or Marke Value) is useful mechanism to handle this 
problem. EVE is the value of the firm if its assets are instantaneously liquidated 
(Assuming the availability of liquid markets). Book value vis-a-vis EVE comparison 
given an idea of whether the "fair" value is being reflected. 
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